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The stagnation of international trade.between the world wars gave 
rise, with a lag, to a reconsideration of pre-1914 classical orthodoxy 
regarding the role of trade policies on economic development. Even as 
Nurkse, Prebisch and Myrdal wrote, however, the post World War II trade 
boom was gathering momentum. By the 1960s it was clear that such a boom 
was not a passing cyclical phenomenon, and, not surprisingly, a substantial 
neoclassical revival followed in the applied trade and development literature, 
although pure trade theory was becoming increasingly agnostic regarding 
free trade. This paper will survey primarily what has been written since 
1960 on the impact of trade policies of less developed countries (LDCs) on 
their growth and development. It will, on the whole, leave aside the literature 
on trade policies of developed countries. 
What is to be included among "trade policies"? Pride of place will 
be given to· those influencing significantly the level and composition of 
exports of goods and services, although those associated with inducing import 
substitution beyond the levels dictated by market forces will also be 
level by encouragingdiscussed. Most LDCs can influence their long.run import 
or discouraging exports, while in practice, they are unlikely to expand 
a someexports just by increasing their imports, simple point ignored by 
import liberalization attempts of the 1960s. In other words, although one 
tocan imagine increases in imports triggering mechanisms which will lead 
higher exports, the lags and frictions of that process are likely to be 
substantially greater than those involved between an export rise and the 
onfollowing import expansion. Exchange rate policy, taxes and subsidies 
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merchandise trade, special credit programs, etc., are obvious examples of 
trade pol5.cies influencing exports. There are, however, other policies 
which will influence exports, and not just in the trivial sense that in 
general equilibrium everything depends on everything else. It is an 
old point, recently reemphasized and quantified (Birnberg and Resnick, 1971) 
that infrastructure financed by government can be more or less trade-biased. 
Moreover, policies toward multinational corporations (MNCs) have become 
for many countries a key element of their export-promotion plans. 
Indeed, the classroom distinction between the current and capital 
accounts, and the corresponding separation between policies toward trade 
and t~ward capital flows is becoming increasingly irrelevant in world 
markets dominated by MNCs, even more so than it was already in 1929, when 
John H. Williams chided the classical theory of international trade for 
neglecting, in ·spite of Adam Smith's insights, the relation between 
international trade and capital migration. However, space allows us only 
superficial incursions into these broader interactions between the current 
and capital accounts, and between traditional trade and other developmental 
policies. Subjects like LDC external debt and international reserves 
management will be. totally ignored. 
Even if the foreign exchange available for imports ·of goods and 
services is regarded as given, the mechanisms used to allocate such an 
amount among competing uses still have important repercussions on the 
development of a country. Some of the most interesting recent research 
in the field of trade and development has dealt precisely with the details 
and consequences of different policies for repressing and controlling 
imports of goods and services. 
Discussion of import repressing policies, like tariffs and quotas, 
tend to give them an exaggerated autonomous or trigger role, from which 
certain resource allocation decisions are supposed to follow. Yet in 
most contemporary developing countries those policies are only one weapon 
in the planning arsenal of the state, and frequently only an accommodating 
instrument, which follows decisions taken elsewhere. For example, a 
public investment bank may decide, as part of an industrialization program, 
to set up a petrochemical plant with or without private sector help; once 
that decision is approved, tariffs or quotas will be adjusted and changed 
as frequently as it is necessary so that the new plant can sell all of its 
output domestically. Tax rebates, low interest loans, etc., will also 
help the new plant. Thus, research on LDC trade policies should ideally 
be carried out in the context of their domestic development policies 
(Bhagwati and Krueger, 1972). 
Trade policy instruments are far easier to describe than the target 
of economic development. By now everyone knows that for most LDCs growth 
of per capita GNP is only one of the several development targets. A more 
equal income distribution among families and regions and a greater degree 
of national autonomy are, inter alia, other developmental targets, which 
sometimes conflict with one another, even when they do not include lofty 
desires to create a "New Man." Glib references·to different targets are 
frequently used to justify all kinds of trade policies. which are most 
unlikely to serve the efficient pursu~t of any goal. Nevertheless. real 
trade-offs do remain. 
LDCs differ not only in the weight they, or their ruling groups. give 
to different development targets, but also, of course, in their size, 
resource endowment, per capita income. etc. This reminder of the limitations 
of purely qualitative arguments is sometimes lost in the fury of the ancient 
debate between protectionists and free traders. And these typological 
considerations can be more important for trade policie~ than differences 
in developmental targets. Many aspects of the trade experience of Taiwan, 
for exa~ple, may be more relevant to Cuha than those of the U.S.S.R., while 
India is unlikely to find much inspiration in the Hong Kong model. 
The traditional central question in the field of trade and development, 
as put by Meier (1968), is: Are the gains from trade in conflict with the 
gains from growth? Or more simply, is international trade good or bad for 
growth and development? Kindleberger's (1962, p. 211) answer indicated 
that the question should be rephrased. The relevant queries seem to be 
the following: 
1. Under what conditions will free trade (or more trade) increase 
per capita growth? 
2. Under what conditions will free trade· (or more trade) bring LDCs 
closer to their other development targets? 
3. Can the LDCs, by their own actions, influence how much they trade? 
4. Can the above qualitative effects be quantified even roughly, 
and what does such quantification te 11 us about the importance of 
trade policies (for good and evil) in achieving th~ different 
development targets? 
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows: First, recent 
theoretical work will be reviewed. to see what answers it suggests to 
the above questions and what guidance it gives to empirical studies. Next, 
research on economic history, and on long term and cross section patterns 
will be surveyed. It will be seen that theoretical studies cast (an 
uncertain) light primarily on the first question, while providing some 
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tools which can he used, although they seldom are, to analyze the second. 
Research on pre-World War II economic history, and cross section studies 
yield scattered and contradictory hints for answering the first three 
questions. TI1e paper will then examine empirical work on the issue of 
whether and by how much the LDCs can affect the level and compositiori of 
their exports, focusing on the rout of export pessimism during the 1960s. 
Recent work on some perennial issues surrounding the export sector will 
be discussed next. Attention will turn afterwards to work discussing 
mechanisms for suppressing import demand. Finally, quantification attempts 
which have been or need to be done on the several links between trade and 
development, in the world as it exists circa 1973, will be discussed. Some 
cranky conclusions, in the spirit of self-criticism, close the paper. 
Guidance from Theoretical Developments 
In the trade and development literature there has existed for a long 
time, at least going back to John S. Mill, a striking difference between 
the rigor of formal proofs on the static advantages of free trade, typically 
involving careful assumptions and caveats, and the impetuous enthusiasm 
with which most of the professional mainstream advocates free or freer 
trade policies, on both static and dynamic grounds, for all times and places. 
Positive theories of trade and of balance of ~ayments adjustment mechanisms 
. have come and gone, but whether one subscribes to "vent for surplus," 
Ricardian, Heckscher-Ohlin, or product cycle theories of trade, or to 
monetarist, absorption, or elasticities approaches to balance of payments 
adjustment, the typical normative advice on trade policy comes out pretty 
much the same. The leap from the sensible proposition that some trade can 
potentially make everyone better off as compared with no trade, to the 
conviction that more trade is always likely to do just that, is taken with 
remarkable ease. 
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The mainstream has tended to minimize what Mill called "the temporary 
inconvenience of the change" toward freer trade. It is ironic that one of 
the few recent efforts to conceptualize and quantify the burden of adjusting­
to freer trade policies has been done for one of the richest countries in 
the world, the U.S.A. (Baldwin and Mutti, 1972). 
Even leaving aside adjustment costs, the tension between guarded 
theoretical results and the ultra-pro-trade-biased obiter-dicta of the 
professional mainstream has sharply increased during the 1950s and 1960s, 
as a result of general theoretical developments and what may be called the 
Indian planner's revenge. Once the Pandora's box of distortions and the 
second~best had been opened by professionally respectable hands (Haberler, 
1950; Little, 1950; Lipsey and Lancaster 5 1956-67), intellectual curiosity 
plus the fact that modern analytical tools were falling more and more 
into the hands of economists whose background made them skeptical of trad­
itional free trade verities and who rightfully resented the glib conventional 
wisdom of bureaucrats in aid-granting organizations, generated consis~ent 
theoretical models embodying more or less realistic distortions, and in which 
free trade need not always be the best policy available. 
It is true that in those static models (for exampl~, Johnson, 1965a; 
Bhagwati, 1971) taxes or subsidies on international trade are not the optimal pol­
icies except in the old-fashioned case of monopoly power in international markets, 
if there are other policy instruments at hand which can tackle distortions dir­
ectly. But it is easy to see that different assumptions regarding availabil-
ity, effectiveness as well as real costs of different policy instruments can 
yield a disconcerting variety of heterodox conclusions. By now any bright 
graduate student, by choosing his assumptions regarding disto1"1:ion$ and 
policy instruments carefully, can produce a consistent model yielding 
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just about any policy recommendation he favored at the start. Note that 
to reach this conclusion one needs not to introduce other developmental 
targets besides static efficiency. The conclusion, of course, applies 
a fortiori when other targ~ts are brought in. 
Algebra and consistent models cari prove nothing about the real 
world, but perhaps the major contribution of these models, and of those 
sure to follow them, is to force the discussion of the realism of different 
assumptions which are crucial for determining under what conditions more 
trade benefits whom, and by how much. Given our professional discipline 
and prejudices, this result could not have been accomplished only by 
outside critics, who did not frame their doubts and skepticism in 
accepted mainstream theoretical language. 
Postwar theoretical developments (Meade, 1955; Johnson, 1960) have 
also provided neoclassical frameworks for quantifying costs and benefits 
of trade policies for small or large countries. Typically, the strict 
application of that methodology to actual situations yields the result 
in trade policy will raise or lower the nation'sthat contemplated changes 
GNP by at most a few percentage points (see, for example, Harberger, 1959). 
Introducing effective rates of protection into calculations, making alternative 
assumptions as to whether protected industries will dis~p~ear under free 
trade (Balassa, 1966), computing the present discounted value of a 11 future 
benefits of liberalization (Magee, 1972), etc., can raise somewhat those 
results, but not by much. It is possible to get the standard model to 
generate hypothetical situations in which the costs of protection and self­
sufficiency loom large, partly by assuming low elasticities of substitution 
in consumption and production (Johnson, 1965b). 
1 But in countries where 
it maythose ela-sticities are indeed very low, one may wonder whether not 
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be better to work with structuralist or two-gap models, which after all 
are designed to emphasize inflexible economic structures. In short, the 
theoretical model used to show the qualitative superiority of free trade, 
can also show, if accompanied by assumptions most congenial to the neoclassical 
paradigm, i.e., high substitution elasticities, that the benefits are 
quantitatively small. 
At this point, many authors quickly add that static effects are only 
one, and probably the least important, of the positive effects of free 
trade, This is likely to be right, but it implies that the standard neo­
classical theoretical framework has some serious flaws, and fails to 
capture key aspects of the real world (Leibenstein, 1966). Faced with 
the alternative of strict adherence to the pure model yielding small 
quantitative effects or adding to it epicycles so that free trade looks 
quantitatively better, most authors have chosen the latter. This situation 
has a number of similarities with that in growth accounting and in the 
explanation of cross-country productivity differences, where Nelson has 
shown the weaknesses of the pure neoclassical methodology {particularly 
in 1972 and 1973). In all cases the pureneoclassical model is a poor 
guide to ~ntrepreneurial behavior, particularly regarding productivity 
control and the search for and diffusion of innovations, which are more 
likely to explain both growth and productivitv•differences better than 
variations in such things as capital-labor ratios and static allocation. 
With few exceptions {Brainard and Cooper, 1968), uncertainty and costs of 
information have also been left out of neoclassical trade models. 
While competition from world markets can, under the right conditions, 
insure that no major departures from static efficiency will survive in an 
industry, it will not necessarily promote autonomous innovation and adaptation. 
On the other hand, protected entrepreneurs can turn lazy and complacent, 
_q_ 
or could use that market safety to devote their energies toward innovation 
and exports depending on their "animal spirits." Compare, for example, 
the textile industries in Brazil and Colombia, both of which have been 
overprotected for a long time. The former turned X-inefficient (Bergsman, 
1970, Chapter 8), while the latter has been known for its progressiveness 
even before it began exporting in substantial amounts. Or compare quota­
protected Japanese corporations and entrepreneurs with most British ones 
who are exposed to greater import competition, and who are at best 
protected with tariffs. 
International trade in knowledge and technological services, a topic 
of particular interest for developing countries whether those services are 
embodied in direct investment or are hired directly, cannot be handled 
adequately within neoclassical models with assumptions of identical 
production fun~tions and free trade conclusions, even if one is willing 
to neglect Schumpeterian considerations. As put by Johnson (1970a): 
" •.. the essential problem is that reliance on the market principle of 
rewarding investment in the discovery of knowledge, which has the nature 
of a public good, by granting a temporary monopoly of the use of the 
knowledge .... is inherently inefficient" (p. 20). (See also Katz, 1972, 
Chapter 2.) 
Structural models of trade and development (Chenery and Bruno, 1962; 
McKinnon, 1964; Chenery and Strout, 1966), formalizing insights developed 
also within the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America during 
the 1950s (see, for example, United Nations, 1959), since their birth 
tended to sacrifice theoretical rigor for the sake of empirical applicability. 
This fact, particularly regarding the ex-ante, ex-post confusion. plus 
their assumptions of low elasticities of substitution in consumption and 
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production, and of exogenously given growth rates for exports, generated 
c~nsiderabl~ criticism during the increasingly elasticity-optimistic 1960s, 
when the structural models came to be regarded as the intellectual under­
pinning for import substitution strategies (Fei and Ranis, 1968; Bruton, 1969). 
Nevertheless, the simplifications involved in structural models still exert 
considerable intellectual and practical appeal. An example of the former 
can be seen in Findlay's (1971) theoretical tidying up of the two-gap model, 
while fresh empirical applications of revised and extended two-gap models 
continue to be produced (Weisskopf) 1972a; Chenery and Carter, 1972). 
A promising development ii the introduction of some non-zero 
substitution possibilities in planning modela which had generated two-gap 
scenarios, and the quantification of the impact of such a change in assumptions. 
This route seems to lead to a convergence of neoclassical and structuralist 
models; compare, for example, the Johnson (1965b and 1966) simulations ~ith 
the Chenery and Raduchel (1971) arguments and calculations. Neither, of 
course, can quantify X-efficiency effects, induced technical change and costs 
of obtaining information. The latter authors, while admitting that policy 
variables such as the exchange rate can help to fully utilize domestic 
resources, remain doubtful that indirect factor substitution via demand and 
trade can be extensive enough to accommodate very wide variations in factor 
proportions. Their last sentence is worthy of full quotation: "This 
formulation offers the hope for shifting policy discussions from the 
ideological level to empirical questions of estimating structural relations 
and determining policy choices from them. In that context. there need be 
no inconsistency between the structuralist diagnoses of the causes of 
underdevelopment and the use of neoclassical guidelines for planners" (p. 47). 
Two-gappers and neoclassicists agree that the shadow price of foreign 
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exchange in LDCs is generally greater than its official value and that 
the t~o-gap problem is typically a symptom of inefficient allocation 
policies (Chenery, 1971. p. 92). 
The suggested convergence is like 1 v to be aided t-v fresh work on 
models in the neoclassical spirit which directly emhody possihle effects 
of trade on growth, and which subdivide output not onlv into importal-,les 
and exportables. but also into consumption and investment. While the effects 
of growth on trade have been exhaustively analyzed using the Heckscher­
Ohlin-Samuelson framework. much less has been done on the trade-on-growth 
link. Corden (1971) has explored the growth effects of trade which 
" ••• are not necessarily the most important ones in practi~e rut are those 
that emerge most clearly from a simple neoclassical model" (p. 117). His 
emphasis on the impact of trade policies on the relative price and/or 
availahility of.investment goods is, however. likelv to be of verv great 
practical relevance, and offers an important link to the structural models. 
Bardhan's (1970) and Findlay's (1972) dynamization of several aspects 
of trade theory. and their rigorous analysis of trade and development 
problems, are also important steps toward incorporating developmental 
insights into more or less formal trade and development models. although 
it is not always clear how those models could be quantified and used for 
policy purposes. The extension of the distortion literature into more dynamic 
contexts should also yield interesting results. as already indicated by 
the work of Johnson (1967 and 1970b) and Bhagwati (1968~). More could also 
be done to bring the link between income distribution. consumption patterns 
2
and savings into such models. 
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Theoretical work is likely. alas. to continue generating interesting 
parameters and relationships at a much faster rate than such things are 
quantified. But a bringing together of theoretical developments on 
distortions and policy instruments, on the one hand. and on dualistic 
mode ls. on the other. where the "modern" sector is sp li_t up into import­
competing and exporting parts. may yield scenarios useful to guide 
empirical research on historical and contemporary cases where more trade 
yielded poor or ambiguous developmental results. Hopefully, those models 
3
would be more in accordance with the known stylized facts about LDCs 
than most of the present pure trade or pure development models are. It 
would be a matter of pinpointing and selecting the key circumstances under 
which the unavoidable (and the avoidable) rigidities. imperfections and 
distortions in LDC markets set the stage for a failure to capture the 
potential gains from trade for developmental purposes. 
Many of the possible building blocks are at hand; besides the standard 
staple or vent-for-surplus (Caves. 1965; Findlay, 1970, Chapter 4) and 
dualistic models (Ranis and Fei, 1961), one can mention Brecher's (1972) 
work on the role of minimum wages in trade theory, showing the possibilitv 
that larger·exports lead to greater unemployment. Also worth noting are 
the Hymer and Resnick (1969) model of agrarian economies with non-argricultural 
activities. and the Birnberg and Cohen (1971) second-best analysis in the 
context of distorted development conditions. The beautiful Lewis - (W. A. Lewis 1~6S·) 
model explaining trends in terms of trade for tropical exports. as well as 
relative standards of living, on the basis of average labor productivity in 
food production in tropical and temperate countries. lends itself to a 
num~er of extensions, and also to different interpretations, some of which 
are of a nee-Marxist radical character (Emmanuel. 1972. pp. 87-90). Besides 
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Emmanuel. nee-Marxist contrirutions to pure trade theorv. in contrast 
with those in economic history and theory of capital movements are scanty. 
The further exploration of differences in production functions 
between DCs and LDCs, which may varv from sector to sector. could also 
yield some relevant insights. combined with- research along the product 
cycle line pioneered by Vernon (summarized in 1971). The works of Linder 
.(1961) and Nelson (1968) also contain a number of ideas and hypotheses 
waiting to be further expanded. The old complaint that comparative 
advantage models were insufficiently "dynamic" is on the way of being met, 
probably with a vengeance. As in the case of recent explorations of the 
infant industry argument for protection, more empirical studies could 
greatly enrich theoretical analysis. 
; 
This kind of work can re extended to the analysis of the impact 
4of direct fore~gn investment on LDC economies. See for example the paper 
by Cohen (1972b), in which cases are generated in the context of development~ 
dualistic models, where the impact of incoming foreign investment on the 
host economy can be negative. The concept of an optimal tax or subsidy on 
international capital movements, developed by Kemp (1966) and Jones (1967), 
should also be of interest to empirical researchers and economic historians, 
and particularly to tpose with a radical bent. 
Another line of theoretical endeavor in which fruitful interactions 
with empirical research will continue to occur is the analysis of illegal foreign 
trade transactions, such as smuggling and fake invoicing (Bhagwati and Hansen~ 
1973a). An interesting political economy sidelight in this field would explore 
asymmetries in what different countries regard as legal transactions, or 
at least transactions not vigorously persecuted. The importation of 
some commodities (e.g., marijuana) is actively repressed in most rich 
·countries, which complain that many LDCs tolerate such exports from their 
territories. On the other hand, most LDCs ban the export of archeological 
items deemed part of their heritage, while the same items have entered 
into rich countries either legally, according to their own laws, or 
using illegal routes not zealously guarded by authorities preferring not 
to upset wealthy collectors. 
The application to international trade and development of theories 
involving externalities and the misuse of valuable but unclaimed assets 
is also likely to grow, as a result of LDC interest in pollution (parti­
cularly the desire of some LDCs to develop comparative advantage in 
pollution-intensive activities)s as well as in the sharing of mankind's 
"comments," such as oceans and space, explaining some preemptive enclosure 
movements (the 200 miles issue). 
This review of theoretical developments has, following custom, dealt 
with real or long run trade theory. As will be seen below, much recent 
empirical work on LDC trade problems has called attention to their short 
run adjustment mechanisms. Development theorists have tended to ignore 
the cyclical-macroeconomic problems of LDCs, which are typically closely 
tied to balance of payments management, while theorists of adj:ustment 
mechanisms for rich countries have paid little attention to the case of 
LDCs. As a result, theoretical analysis of LDC-short term policies for 
simultaneously achieving internal and external balance, as well as 
income distribution and growth targets, has been neglected. A notable 
exception is the recent paper of Taylor (lq73), which correctly emphasizes 
the particularly difficult dilemmas faced by policy makers in many semi­
industrialized economies. 
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Reexamination of the Pre-World War II Economic History of Trade Policies 
and Development 
The nineteenth cenl:ur'yrole of freer trade in weakening the position 
of unprogressive British landlords, the real targets of Ricardo, plus 
the fact that it accompanied the settlement and/or prosperity of some 
predominantly Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian developing countries, has had a 
disproportionate influence in tilting the mainstream literature, dominated 
by Anglo-S3xon and Scandinavian authors, toward a benign and optimistic 
view of the trade and growth nexus. The combined population of· Australia. 
Canada, New Zealand, Denmark and Sweden around 1900 was 18 million, figurea 
roughly equal to that for the combined population of Taiwan and Hong Kong 
today. If to those five successful countries one adds Argentina, South 
Africa, and Uruguay, their total 1900 population reaches 31 million, or 
less than two per cent of the world population at that time, and about the 
demographic size of today's South Korea. 
The Nurksian notion of trade as the historical engine of growth has 
recently been challenged even for some "countries of recent settlement." 
Kravis (1972)· rejects the view that causal predominance can be assigned 
to external demand factors in accounting for nineteenth century U.S. economic 
growth; he also argues (Kravis, 1970) that international trade policies 
and performances cannot provide a differential diagnosis to explain varying 
growth records of countries in the nineteenth century. Trade, at best, 
was a handmaiden of a growth whose mainsprings were internal, and it may 
be added, difficult to locate exactly. In a Kindlebergerian spirit, Kravis 
also suggests that both trade and investment can be fickle and opportunistic 
handmaidens; they mav serve growth, but could also structuresserve 
perpetuating underdevelopment. 
-16-
For the Canadian case, Chambers and Gordon (1966) applied a strict 
neoclassical model to quantify the share of the increase in per capita 
income during 1901-11 which could be attributed to the wheat export boom. 
·Not surprisingly, given the methodology, that share came out small, about 
6 per cent. Although Caves (1971a) accepts t-heir conclusion that advances 
in international technological knowledge and its application are likely 
to comprise the main source of income gains for small nations, a conclusion 
whose policy implications are unclear, he adjusts the Chambers and Gordon's 
calculations in mildly heterodox ways, raising that share to 21 per cent. 
In the same article, Caves has also provided a thorough survey (with 
extensive bibliography) and stimulating discussion of possible uses of the 
export-led growth model as a research tool, concluding that it is best 
applied to national or regional time series, but difficult to handle in 
cross-country ~tudies. The important difference between extensive and 
per capita growth also receives attention from Caves, and Chambers and 
Gordon. 
Skepticism regarding the historical predominance of beneficial links 
between trade and development has always increased when attention shifted 
to those countries which even today remain underdeveloped. In many of 
those countries, freer trade policies were adopted durin~ the nineteenth 
century and up to 1930 not always simply as a result of the persuasive 
powers of Mill and Ricardo, but mainly as a consequence of unequal treaties 
imposed forcefully by colonial and neocolonial powers (see, for example, 
Hansen and Nashashibi, 1972, Chapter 1). Little wonder, then, that free 
trade policies which had to be buttressed by foreign gunhoats failed to 
be universally viewed by LDCs as obvious handmaidens of their development. 
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Caves (1971a)discusses some of the reasons usually given for failures 
of rising exports to induce significant and self-sustained growth in developing 
countries, listing (pp. 433-37) ten possible and more or less positive linkages 
between staple export expansion and intensive growth. He tentatively adds an 
interesting eleventh effect, which contrary to the typical presumption in t~e 
literature on LDC export instability, suggests in a Schumpeter-Hirschman spirit 
that irregular (supply induced) bursts of staple exports will " ••• spur a larger 
quantity of capital formation and more diverse type of projects, than a growth 
process not attended by windfalls ••• " (p. 437). Leff (1972a and 1972b) blames 
economic retardation in nineteenth century Brazil on too few rather than too 
many exports; lack of internal capacity to transform and reallocate resources 
led to Brazilian failures to adapt and profit fully from shifts in a comparative 
advantage. He also introduces into the historical discussion the notion of 
optimum currency areas, suggesting that populations in large LOCs would have 
been better off had they been distributed among several smaller nation-states, 
rather than one large country with poor internal factor mobility. 
Lewis (1969, Lecture 1) indicates that pessimism regarding the historical 
trade an0 development link is largely an optical illusion. Trade, he argues, 
was indeed an engine of growth for most of the tropics having ''a stab le and 
modern type of government," at least during 1880 to 1913. The illusion arises: 
from failure to realize that, given large subsistence sectors, trade was a 
smaller proportion of tropical economies than manufacturing was of temperate 
economies; from neglect of the fact that the starting point for LDCs was very 
low, due mainly to poor agricultural productivity; from too much emphasis on the 
"special" cases of land-poor India and the sugar islands; and from not putting 
the dismal interwar period in proper historical perspective. It should 
be noted that Lewis is not so much trying to give new life to the 
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thesis of trade as an engine of growth, as to comhat views arguing that 
tropical growth would not be possible until deep spiritual and social 
transformations had occurred in those countries. 
Other authors, contrary to Lewis, have emphasized the disruptive effects 
of expanding trade on underdeveloped economies, as well as the weaknesses 
or negative nature of backward linkages, uneven distribution of gains from 
trade, etc. Several have noted that, contrary to British experience, freer 
trade strengthened the economic and political position of landlords and 
regressive elements in LDC societies. 
The upsurge of radical economics during the 1960s gave fresh impetus 
to such historical views and research. See for example the work of Resnick 
(1970) on the decline of rural industry under export expansion in Southeast 
Asia, the Hymer and Resnick (1971) paper on international trade and uneven 
development, arid that of G. Frank (1970) on Latin America. These and other 
authors, not all "radical," stress that asymmetries in political and military 
power will be reflected not only in asymmetries in the distribution of the 
burden of adjusting to equilibrium disturbances, but also in the det·ermination 
of equilibrium itself. The more extreme thesis is that markets grow out 
of the barrel of a gun, so the powerful can play the market following the 
rule of '·'heads I win, tails you lose." Although this extreme version 
appears to be an exaggeration, it is clearly incorrect to assume that 
markets exist independent of socio-political and power realities, as shown 
by the experience of markets under colonialism. The colonial experience with 
markets, in turn, varied according to the policies of hegemonic powers 
(Birnberg and Resnick, 1971). See also the discussion by Triffin (1968) of 
the actual workings of the gold standard during the nineteenth century, 
showing how Britain thrust the major burden of adjusting to her cyclical 
balance of payments difficulties onto the countries of the periphery. 
Drawing heavily on pre-World War II historical experience, Sunkel 
(1969) and Furtado (1971) have elaborated building blocks of the Latin 
American "dependence" school, which examines not only the purely economic 
links r.etween trade and growth, including the inducement to technological 
change, but also reemphasizes negative long run effec__ts of export-led
I 
growth on the autonomous development of LDC social and political institutions. 
Contrary to Mill, who celebrated the impact on LDC tastes of the introduction 
of new products, these authors point to negative economic and social 
repercussions of international demonstration effects in consumption. Other 
authors have also lamented the spread of "consumerism" implicit in outward­
looking trade policies, suspecting undesirable shifts in indigenous tastes. 
Girvan (1972) has noted the independent but related development of similar 
ideas in the sugar ex~colo~ies or plantation economies of the Caribbean. 
The dependence school, although providing numerous inter-disciplinary insigh~s, 
still contains several ambiguities (Pinto, 1972). It remains unclear, 
for example, whether dependence has more to do with economic size than with 
social system, and whether only LDCs are dependent. Indeed, a fully 
satisfactory definition of "dependence" is hard to find, and the policy 
prescriptions flowing from this school are vague. 
G. Frank (1970) has emphasized the healthy response·of several 
Latin.American economies to the great depression of the 1930s, as well as 
to the two world wars, suggesting that, contrary to orthodoxy, LDCs do best 
when the rich are weakest. But he seems to have interpreted a situation 
in which the more advanced IDCs were doing the best of a bad thing, in the 
trade field, as one absolutely preferable, from che LDC viewpoint, to world 
wide prosperity. Frank's thesis is stronger in the area of direct foreign 
investment; for example, several LDCs took advantage of conditions during 
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the Secqnd World War to buy back rather cheaply European assets within 
their territories. Further comparative work on various LDC reactions to 
the Depression and the world wars should provide insights comparable to 
those of Kindleberger (1951) regarding group behavior and international 
trade. Frank also has given historical examples of regions geographically 
remote and isolated from metropolitan centers, claiming that they initiated 
and experienced the most promising self-generating economic development in 
Latin America, before they were stopped by lower transport costs and freer 
trade. 
It should be clear by now that historical research yields no less 
ambiguous results than those surveyed under theory. The problem is not 
only the different ideologies and nationalities of the authors, but also 
the different weights placed by them on the various dimensions of development, 
and their non-testable views on "what it could have been," had the countries 
remai~ed isolated from international trade currents. In history, as in 
cross-section research to be reviewed below, our small and young planet does 
not seem to provide enough variance and sufficient degrees of freedom to 
test our theories unambiguously. 
It has been the practice of many economists, when faced with 
historical or contemporary situations in.which it appears, prima facie, 
that growing trade led to weak or negative developmental results, to blame 
lack of LDC "preconditions," or market imperfections and distortions, or 
weak "societal responses" to development opportunities, etc., without usually 
bothering to further define and analyze these factors and explanations, 
which verge on the tautological. 1\10 avenues seem worth exploring to cast 
further light on the absolute or relative historical failures in the trade 
and development literature. 
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One, already mentioned, would be to set up realistic models useful 
. to isolate market frictions and distortions which account for unsatisfactory 
U>C reactions to trade stimuli, and to contrast thoae imperfections with 
the policy tools which LDC government had at hand before 1930. It is 
often forgotten that, whether independent or not, most of those governments 
had little control over their exchange rates, due to their commitment to 
the gold standard, and that most did not even have a central bank, while 
their fiscal machinery was rudimentary. Little wonder, then, that in LDCs 
characterized by large subsistence sectors and imperfect markets, the 
abandonment of one of the few policy tools those governments had, e.g., 
tariff rates, bad often to be imposed by foreign pressure. 
A second, and more difficult, step would be to look at social and 
political institutions which lie behind market distortions and imperfections, 
and which could also explain the degree and speed of the spread of educative 
effects arising from a more open economy (Myint, 1969). Why did LDC 
governments, for example, mow greater interest in breaking some infrastructure 
bottlenecks rather than others? Who gained, if anybody, and who lost from 
such imperfections and institutional arrangements? Were those imperfections 
a result of policies? If not, could they have been resolved by policy? 
The Post World War II LDC Experience with Trade Policies and Developrr.ent; 
·Empirical Research on the Overall Performance. 
Three major styles can be noted in scholarly empirical work looking 
at overall LDC postwar performance on trade and development: the econometric 
analysis of cross-section and time series data for many countries; more 
specific country or sector studies; and grand summaries. On the whole, 
these three styles look at the aggregate picture, and skip exhaustive 
discussion of the details in the trade and development nexus. 
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Inspired by the monumental work of Kuznets (see, for example, 1966 
and 1967), the econometric analysis of LDC cross-section and time series 
data starts with the hypothesis that there are uniform patterns of change 
in the structure of production as income levels rise, subject to secular 
shifts due to innovational changes. The paper by Chenery and Taylor (1968) 
may be taken as the best published example of this school. Three I.DC 
development patterns are isolated; for large countries (more than 15 to 25 
million inhabitants), small industry-oriented countries, and small 
primary-oriented countries. From the viewpoint of this survey, the most 
striking result of Chenery-Taylor is that so much can be explained without 
reference to variations in trade policies, once differences in size and 
5 
resource endowments are taken into account. While many LDCs have followed 
roughly similar trade policies, there has been a fair degree of variance 
among them (Me~ico vs. Brazil, Philippines vs. Egypt, etc.), so the 
Chenery-Taylor results cannot be explained by saying that no policy effect 
is detected because all LDC policies were the same. Size and resources 
in this article seem to be destiny, and all that policy appears to do is 
to somewhat speed or delay a given LDC along its preordained development 
path, but cannot change the pattern. This will not bother those most 
interested in the link between trade policies and per capita growth, but 
will dtsturb those hoping to use trade policies to significantly alter 
the productive structures associated with a given per capita income. Trying 
to give a small primary oriented country the industrial structure of a 
diversified large country will simply stop or slow down growth. But it is 
also implied that India and Brazil, liberalize as they may, will maintain 
6 
a diversified and "heavy" industrial structure. 
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The quantification of the more short-term structural models generated 
by the Chenery planning school has focused on the identification of major 
· development bottlenecks, usually either savings or foreign exchange, for 
a given country, and on the measurement of the impact of foreign resource 
inflows on growth, and more recently, on domestic savings. These efforts 
have yielded the measurement for many countries of important functions, 
such as those for imports and savings, as well as for the link between 
investment and output. An interesting summary of the latest refinements 
for these functions may be found in Chenery and Carter (1972). Unfortunately, 
export functions continue to be a weak spot in these constructions, which 
typically make exports depend simply on time. 
Weisskopf (1972a) has proposed and applied an econometric test for 
whether the growth of a given LDC is constrained by lack of savings or 
foreign exchange. He concludes that a binding trade constraint, contrary 
to the usual belief, has been a relatively infrequent phenomenon in LDC 
postwar experience. Some of his results are puzzling; for example, Peru 
comes out dominated by a trade constraint while Colombia appears bound by 
a savings constraint. His ex-ante savings function makes exports one of 
the independent variables, on the ground that for many countries a strong 
ex-post link has been observed between exports and savings. There are also 
~ priori reasons to expect some connection between exports and savings; 
for example, public savings often rely heavily on trade taxes. This 
formulation is now common in Chenery-style models; see Landau (1971), 
and for an earlier formulation, Vanek (1967). Such specification appears 
to further blur the distinction between the savings and foreign exchange 
constraints. It could be argued that a close link between fluctuating 
savings and exports is observed simply because the latter allow the importation 
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of machinery, unavailable otherwise, which national accounts register 
as investment, and therefore, given accounting procedures, as residual 
domestic savings. 
The Chenery-style savings function has also generated controversy in 
the related area of the impact of capital inflows, or just aid, on domestic 
savings. Weisskopf (1972b) and others have argued that the evidence 
indicates a strong negative correlation between savings and foreign aid. 
Papanek (1972 and 1973) has provided a convincing critique of the methodology 
used in reaching those results. The key problem is the peculiar definition 
which makes domestic savings a function, inter alia, of domestic output, 
and not on a measure of disposable income, which for a country as a whole 
would include the grant element of capital inflows. Papanek notes that 
given the misleading definition of domestic savings as equal to investment 
minus all fore~gn resource inflows, any increase in investment which is 
smaller than the increase in foreign inflows will by definition le~d to an 
absolute drop in recorded domestic savings. A pure grant from abroad, for 
example, used fully for relief, i.e., consumption, which leaves domestic 
:investment unchanged, will lead by the illogic of this accounting to a recorded 
drop in domestic savings. Papanek urges separate treatment of different 
capital inflows, and also observes that many other reali~tic considerations 
indicate that factors which produce below average savings rates will produce 
above average foreign inflows. On the whole, these and other econometric 
exercises are on more solid ground when working directly with investment data 
than with those ill-defined residuals now labelled domestic savings. 
During the 1960s there has been a voluminous outpouring of country 
and sector studies for LDCs, which typically devote substantial sections to 
discussing trade policies and development. In many cases, pre-World War II trends 
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are discussed at least as background to postwar developments. While 
these studies emphasize the experience and institutions of particular 
countries, they generally rely, implicitly or explicitly, tightly or 
loosely, on one or several of the standard trade and development models. 
The Yale Economic Growth Center, for example,has sponsored a series of 
ambitious country studies having both a historical and trade orientation. 
No grand summing up of these country studies has yet appeared, and if 
any such ever comes along, it would have to emphasize the variety of trade 
and developmental experiences found in those volumes. 
Criticism of LDC trade policies hampering export expansion, of 
delayed and sporadic devaluations under inflationary conditions, and of 
erratic and excessive protectionism are themes which appear in some of the 
Yale country studies, particularly in that for Argentina. This theme is 
also develope9 in the Nelson, Schultz and Slighton (1971) volume on Colombia; 
and in that of S. Lewis (1969) for labor-rich Pakistan. Other country 
studies have been written around open dualistic land-surphus mode-ls. 
Examples include the work of Helleiner (1966) on Nigeria, and that of Hicks 
and McNicoll (1971) on the Philippines. The latter authors not only warn 
against excessive import substitution, but also against continued reliance 
on resource-intensive export growth. 
Interesting examples of sectoral studies emphasizing the trade and 
development nexus include Roemer (1970), C. Reynolds (in Mamalakis and 
Reynolds, 1965) and Leff (1968). The major contribution of the first book 
lies in its analytical description of the Peruvian fishmeal industry, 
blending applied theory, straightforward econometrics and interesting 
narrative. That book's weakness is typical of many recent works on trade 
and development; together with scientific analysis of a specific case the 
author gives us an evangelical description of the benefits of the export-led 
development ~n general. The capricious anchovies, alas, have decided to 
jolt this particular success story by mysteriously disappearing from 
Peruvian coasts throughout 1972. Reynold's study of how the then foreign­
owned copper sector interacted with the Chiiean economy developed the concept 
of "returned value," i.e., that part of copper sales abroad paid locally 
in the form of wages, taxes, purchase of materials, etc., a more significant 
magnitude than the gross exports of those enterprises. This concept, 
incidentally, could be fruitfully applied to some new LDC manufacturing 
export activities, dominated by MNCs and which rely heavily on foreign 
inputs. 
While Roemer and Reynolds expanded the established export economy 
research line, Leff's study of the Brazilian capital goods industry analyzes 
in depth the h~storical evolution of import substituting activities, a relatively 
new and much needed re.search endeavor. The growth of that Brazilian industry, 
he found, was achieved without import restrictions, thanks partly to an 
elastic domestic supply for the required inputs, including technical and 
skilled personnel. He is also skeptical of the thesis that the development 
of domestic capital goods industry by itself will lead to accelerated rates 
of capital formation, at least for big Brazil. A related study, that of 
Baer (1969), also provides a favorable analysis of the expansion of the 
Brazilian steel industry. 
As a result of the outpouring of country and sectoral studies, as 
well as of more specialized articles, on which more below, survey articles 
and books began to appear in the middle 1960s, attempting to evaluate overall 
LDC development and trade strategies. Import substituting industrialization 
received early and mostly critical attention, as in the paper by Macario (1964). 
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Criticism came from both neoclassicists and some Latin American str
ucturalists 
who argued that import substitution would inevitably lead to economic
 
stagnation unless incomes were drastically redistributed. The Willi
ams 
group also provided, besides original research, valuable surveys, s
uch as 
those of Bruton (1970) and Sheahan (1972). The weaknesses of the "
import 
substitution syndrome" are by now being repeated ad nauseum, and fa
irly 
sympathetic reviews of that strategy, such as those by Hirschman (1
968) and 
Baer (1972), are grossly outnumbered by orthodox and structuralist cr
itics. 
The critique of LDC policies used to induce import substituting 
industrialization reached a climax with the publication of the Litt
le, 
Scitovsky and Scott comparative volume (1970), to be referred hereaft
er as 
lSS, together with accompanying country studies on Brazil (Bergsman, 
1970), 
India (Bhagwati and Desai, ·1970), Mexico (King, 1970), Pakistan (Le
wis, 1970), 
and Taiwan and the Philippines (Hsing, Power and Sicat, 1970). It 
may be 
noted, first of all, that as could be expected not all country volu
mes fully 
share precise critical stance, nor all of the views, of the comparati
ve work; 
this is particularly true for the Bergsman book. 
LSS argue that near-first-best efficient policies are more practica
l 
than people in developing countries realize, and that they would al
so improve 
income distribution. LDC industry has been overencouraged ,relative 
to 
agriculture, they charge, and the selection of activities to be fav
ored within 
industry has been careless. They recognize some arguments for spe
cial 
encouragement of industry, such as the infant industry thesis, unsk
illed 
industrial wages higher than opportunity costs, external economies 
arising 
from knowledge or training spillovers for which industry cannot cha
rge fully, 
But these and otherand from complementarity in industrial investments. 
They recommend,arguments do not necessarily justify taxes on foreign trade. 
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on grounds of wage distortion, the equivalent of a general labor subsidy of 
up to 50 per cent, which depending on the labor intensity of each industry, 
would imply "promotion" of up to roughly 20 per cent of value added. Other 
perarguments could increase the subsidy in rare and ad-hoc cases.up to 50 cent 
of value added, but they expect the average justifiable subsidy to be no more 
than about 20 per cent. They add that in the more advanced developing 
countries there may be no justification for promotion at all. In all cases, 
for onlyquantitative controls would be eventually abolished, or kept use 
onunder emergency conditions, and import and export taxes, unless justified 
optimum tariff or fiscal grounds, would be gradually phased out. Any remaining 
import duties would be matched by (equivalent) internal indirect taxes. The 
exchange rate would be allowed to seek its optimum-trade equilibrium, with 
small but frequent changes if necessary. The optimum amount of import 
substitution would then come out as a by-product of this system. 
LSS find that the major distortion existing in the seven countries 
they and their collaborators studied is the very high level of protection 
resulting from various forms of restricting imports, and the uneven nature of 
such protection. They blame the use of protection against imports to encourage 
number of undesirable LDC Industrializationindustrialization for a trends. 
policies are said to have aggravated inequalities in income, distribution, 
benefiting mainly a small group of industrialists, plus a working class aristocracyo 
Adding insult to injury, it turns out that many "infant" industries are run 
by large MNCs. Untaxed excess profits, which when captured by local entrepreneurs 
represent domestic income redistribution, can further tilt the balance toward 
an unfavorable national result when those foreign owned activities are heavily 
subsidized by protection. Local industrialists have not always been induced to 
accumulate more domestic capital out of their high profits, choosing instead good 
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l~ving more appropriate to affluent societies, or foreign bank accounts. 
Tariff levels and structures, with low duties on capital goods, and 
arbitrary import control rules,·are said to have encouraged capital 
,intensive industries and techniques, as well as widespread excess industrial 
capacity, aggravating the problem of unemployment. Employment in agriculture 
and labor intensive exports, on the other hand, have been discouraged. 
Import controls are said to have induced corruption. 
Agricultural output naturally has also suffered, and at least in 
some countries social overhead capital is said to have been neglected 
due to excessive preoccupation with protection and industry. The bias against 
exports created by protection, plus overvaluation of exchange rates and 
the excessive import demand paradoxically generated by import substituting 
industrialization, led to persistent balance of payments difficulties, and 
to exchange bottlenecks which LSS would not call structural. They also 
note that possibilities for easy import substitution would sooner or. later 
become exhausted, but at that point the necessary export growth will be 
hampered by expensive and shoddy domestic inputs to potential exporters, 
and by overvalued exchange rates inherited from the earlier stages of 
import substitution. In short, many LDCs have neglected c.omparative 
advantage and have failed to reap the full benefits of a decentralized price 
system. 
LSS and the companion volumes contain gradualistic recommendations 
for a transition period between present and recommended policies. LSS also 
question the validity of recorded postwar LDC growth rates, which prima facie 
appear historically impressive, and take pains to show that the industrialized 
countries never had the astronomical protective rates registered now in many 
LDCs. 
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The LSS volume brilliantly captures professional exasperation with 
the errors and missed opportunities in LDC planning and policy making, 
particularly in trade policy, which accumulated during th~ late 1950s and 
the 1960s, as LDC exports lagged behind booming world trade. Had world 
trade stagnated during the 1960s, we would now be reviewing books praising 
.LDC import substituting policies, as indeed such policies are praised for the 
1930s. LSS policy recommendations do not rely on booming world trade, of 
course, and they would argue that under less buoyant circumstances their 
proposals would have resulted in more healthy import-substitution. But 
in the latter case the consequences of different choices among trade policies 
become relatively less important thart when world trade is expa~ding vigorously. 
The LSS volume is not intended as a rigorous presentation of either 
theory or empirical evidenc~, and it is written with a clear desire to 
influence policy·as soon as possible. This makes it highly readable, given 
its subject matter; and influential among policy makers. Sympathy for its 
fundamental cause, however, should not keep us from listing some criticisms 
of it. Before going into those, it should be noted that LSS attempted, even 
if roughly, to translate arguments about externalities and distortions into 
concrete quantitative justifications for different policies. This deserves 
praise, and it is something seldom done by those who casually invoke this or 
that imperfection to justify just about any level of protection, or any other 
policy which happens to come into the head of a policy maker to whom they 
wish to be sympathetic. The leap from vag~e qualitative arguments to 
impetuous policy advocacy is no monopoly of the orthodox, and raises 
important questions regarding the role of theory, and its influence on 
policy advice and empirical research. 
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It is perhaps the LSS interest in influencing policy which leads them 
to couch their presentation too much in terms of old debates, such as 
i~dustry vs. agriculture, or free trade vs. protection, rather than exploring 
more subtly the various links between trade policy and development. As 
with many other authors (including D{az Alejandro, 1970), they lump together 
all features of the "import substitution syndrome," such as import and other 
controls, tariffs,overvalued and pegged exchange rates, spectacular balance 
of payments crises, inflationary pressures, and stop-go cycles. Following 
a '~uilt by association'' procedure, they the~ tend to blame much of what is 
going wrong in LDCs on that ill~defined syndrome. Unsophisticated readers 
may indeed conclude that nearly everything going wrong in LDCs is due to that 
wicked syndrome. 
Consider a mental experiment: what would have happened if, say, 
Argentina and Colombia, had adopted a policy of flexible exchange rates 
back in 1945, while adopting also an across-the-board import tariff of 
150 per cent ad valorem? I suspect their record, at least on growth ·and 
exports, would have been much better. Their harmful stop-go policies may 
be blamed to a large extent on exchange rate management, as in tha case 
of the United Kingdom,and on other short-run policies, that could be analytically 
separated from the long run effects of protect~on, although, of course, a more 
flexible exchange rate policy will also tend to decrease the political muscle 
of protectionists. Similarly, the effects of the level of protection could 
have been separated more clearly in LSS, in a rough quantitative way, from 
the impact of dispersion in protective rates, as well as from effects arising 
from their year-to-year changes. 
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LSS do note the various aspects of the syndrome, as well as country 
to country variations, and are careful to say that problems such as 
unemployment or skewed income distribution are aggravated (not created) 
by protective policies. But the reader is left with the impression that 
the whole "infamous thing" must be eliminated before LDCs can achieve sound 
progress, and that income distribution, the employment picture, administrative 
honesty, etc., will be much better if the LSS policy advice is fo.llowed. 
The authors further expect X-efficiency and technological change to improve 
and accelerate if their policies are followed. It is perhaps revealing 
of the state of our science that LSS decline to quantify the gains countries 
may expect from following their policies, and much less enter into a 
quantitative separation of the costs of the various syndrome features. The 
impact on world trade which would occur if all LDCs followed the LSS advice 
is of course another nice matter left unquantified, although the authors 
devote a good chapter to suggest actions by developed countries which could 
pave the way for such contingency. 
Other attempts to sum up at least parts of the postwar LDC trade and 
development experience typically share the LSS stance. See, for example, 
Keesing (1967), Cohen and Ranis (1971), and Schydlowsky (1972). Discussion 
at that level of generality faces sharply diminishing returns, so it is wiser 
to turn to the various empirical building blocks of the concensus view to 
see how solid are its foundations. 
Can LDCs Affect the Level and Composition of their Exports? The 1960s Rout 
Export Pessimism 
No complicated models are needed to show that if one expects WC 
exports to grow much below their desired GNP growth rates, import substitution, 
however induced, will be a very important part of the development program. 
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And if the supply of foreign exchange is, say, perfectly inelastic with respect 
to changes in the exchange rate, then import duties and even quotas can be made 
to have the same impact on resource allocation, although not on income distrib­
ution, as equilibrium exchange rates. The period between 1914 and 1945 generated 
an export pessimism which lasted well into the 1950s, based on two mutually 
reinforcing strands of thought. The supply price elasticity of exportables 
in LDCs, a domestic parameter, was deemed by many to be low due to institutional 
rigidities, in the case of rural exportables, or to difficulties of entry and 
quality, in the case of non-traditional manufactured goods. Secondly, both 
income and price elasticities of the foreign demand for LDC exports were con­
sidered to be very low. Engel's law, synthetics, etc., were the key code words. 
So export pessimists saw little point in trying to use domestic policy tools, 
such as the exchange rate, to coax a few more exportables out of inelastic 
domestic activities, which were frequently owned either by foreign or by 
nationals regarded as socially unprogressive and already above average in income, 
only to have to push staples on reluctant foreign buyers, perhaps only after 
iminiserizing terms-of-trade declines. 
Empirical research has been blasting away those two major props of 
export pessimism, at least in their most extreme form. In the first place, 
numerous studies have been produced showing that where markets exist, 
i.e., for commercial agriculture, LDC farmers ~ill respond' to relative prices. 
Nowshirvani (1971) surveys this literature, noting also that high prices will 
induce the spread of markets, so that their total economic effect includes 
a movement along a given supply schedule, plus a rightward schedule shift 
due to induced organizational changes. He notes, however, that such total 
price responsiveness is far from an unmixed blessing, as the social consequences 
of the uncontrolled spread of markets can be quite undesirable. Econometric 
•· 
supply response research has become ever more refined, as in Nowshirvani's 
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study (1971) for some food crops in northern India, in which subsistence 
crops showed no price response, while cash crops generally showed positive 
and significant price elasticities of supply. Also noteworthy is Behrman's 
book (1968) on four crops in Thailand using as independent variables not only 
mean prices, rut also their variances. While,in the short run, supply responses 
may be weak or even apparently perverse, as with Argentine beef, most 
studies show a significant and substantial long run positive supply response 
for individual crops and rural activities. For large groups of such activities, 
or for the rural sector as a whole, however, the evidence on price respon­
siveness is much less clear. 
The trade boom of the 1960s, during which the purchasing power of 
nonpetroleum LDC exports rose about three times as rapidly as in the 1950s, 
has provided abundant raw materials for empirical workers trying to show 
that external der.nand for LDC exports is much more price and income elastic 
than the pessimists thought (De Vries, 1967). Leaving aside old staples, 
such as coffee and sugar, whose international marketing can be handled with 
ad hoc policies, it has been shown that even within the area of primary 
products. all kinds of new DC demands have opened up (Cohen, 1970; but see 
Hicks and McNicoll, 1971, who remain skeptical, and warn of resource 
exhaustion). The small share accounted by most LDCs exports of manufactured 
goods in total world trade, and the rapid growth of those exports in 
"success stories," such as South Korea, have been powerful arguments in 
routing both demand and supply pessimism (LSS, Chapter 7). 
Cohen and Sisler (1971) have provided a detailed analysis of LDC 
world market shares in their major exports during the 1960s. They show 
that for commodities where the growth rate of industrial country imports 
from the world was most rapid, LDCs experienced the largest losses in potential 
exports, as the result of not maintaining their market share. They take this 
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fact as prima facie evidence that low LDC export growth rates were due 
primarily to domestic supply problems, often induced or aggravated by 
incorrect domestic policies, rather than lack of external demand. An extreme 
example of a domestically induced decline in world shares would be the 
meat and grain exports of the Argentine Republic; it is hard to believe 
in 1973 that quite late into the 1960s many in that country justified just 
about any import substituting project on the grounds that there was no future 
in world markets for primary products such as beef, corn and wheat. And as 
one watches the U.S., the U.S.S.R., China, Japan and Western Europe plan 
growing trade among themselves in cotton, wheat, natural gas and oil, it is 
hard to remember that such trade was and is regarded by many as an infallible 
symptom of colonial dependency. Indeed, growing preoccupation in rich countries 
about resource exhaustion and undesirable side-effects of synthetics puts us 
back, at least f?r a while, in a Neo-Ricardian-Malthusian scenario. 
The pessimists also missed the rapid 1960s expansion in the demand 
of rich countries for LDC tourist services, which transformed previously 
untradeable LDC "home goods" into earners of foreign exchange. The demand 
for LDC tourist services appears to have a high income elasticity, and for 
some areas also a high price elasticity. 
There is an invincible pessimism even in countries which are now 
dramatically expanding their exports, such as Brazil and Colombia, which 
argues that the expansion cannot continue, or that it is bound to collapse. 
Others simply ignore the facts, and continue to repeat the ! priori 
arguments for pessimism, eagerly greeting each new international monetary 
7 
storm. Nobody, of course, can say for sure that trade wars among Europe, 
Japan and the U.S. could not radically alter the outlook for world trade. 
Another view, reflected in Lewis' (1969) second lecture, is that the expected 
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export expansion to DC markets, although substantial, will still not be 
enough to achieve LDC growth targets, so further import substitution, at 
the regional or all-LDC level, is still required. He does not, however, 
discuss the optimum way of inducing such import substitution. Helleiner 
(1972a, Chapter 2) argues that LDC supply policies and random difficulties 
account in large part for country-to-country differences in export performance, 
but only within constraints imposed by traditional world commodity demand 
factors. 
The direct testing of the link between exchange rate policies and 
the supply responses of non-traditional LDC exports has generally yielded 
significantly positive elasticities, showing that exchange rate policy 
typically does matter. See, for example, the survey and fresh work of 
Eaton (1972). There are, however, some unresolved problems. While the 
time series econometric work shows that the exchange rate matters, it 
frequently suggests that it does not matter very much, explaining only a 
relatively small part of export growth rates. Indeed, as the monetarists 
would expect, examples of countries which have substantially changed their 
real exchange rate for a sustained number of years are few. More sophisticated 
lag structures, exchange rate variances, etc., could in some cases boost the 
quantitative weight of exchange rate variables. 
For many countries, the stability of the real exchange rate may turn 
out to be more important for expanding non-traditional exports than the level of 
such. a variable. But the separate effects as well as the interaction of 
exchange rate policy with the many other LDC export promotion policies remains 
very difficult to quantify, at least using time series. Halevi (1972) notes 
the crucial problem of establishing the functional links betvleen relative 
prices and the structure of capital formation, as well as possible scale effects. 
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There is also the fact, emphasized by Krueger's work on Turkish exports 
(1972a, Chapter 7), that many LDC exports are determined.mainly by government 
domestic policies, e.g., agricultural policies, as well as by direct public 
trade regime itself.interventions in the export market, rather than by the 
Cross section studies on export performance rarely go beyond 
casual empiricism; a promising avenue could be to quantify degrees of under 
or over valuation across LDCs, using either a modified purchasing power 
parity approach
8 
or shadow exchange rate benchmarks, and formally relating 
those measures to export performance. 
Many promotion policies have a net impact per dollar of exports which 
varies substantially from industry to industry, or even firm to firm, while 
others promote exports mainly by providing market and technical information 
inside and outside the country. The former include tax and credit subsidies, 
exemption from import duties, and the creation of free trade zones. The 
fairs. and can also include direct governmentlatter refer to such things as 
pressures to export "or else." Either type of policy presents its own 
difficulties for quantifying supply responses. As already noted, some 
export promotion plans are closely coordinated with policies toward foreign 
to me, and asinvestors. As my colleague Benjamin Cohen has pointed out 
noted long ago by Williams (1929), this complementarity between trade and 
capital movements Cvntrasts with the standard textbook thesis that trade 
and factor movements are substitutes, as indeed they have been in import 
substituting activities. 
The multiplicity of export promoting policies has raised the issue 
of the effectiveness of the different instruments in expanding exports. 
The example of South Korea (C. Frank, 1972) suggests that export success is 
not simply a matter of following neoclassical textbook recipes. Export 
promotion may involve as much haphazard government interventionism as 
import-substitution, (Bhagwati, 1968a). Cuba offers an extreme example of an 
export-promotion strategy with highly centralized socialist planning 
techniques. Thus the issue of the efficiency of the different tools and 
techniqµes must also be raised. 
It is clear that examples of excesses in export promotion, symmetrical 
to excesses in import substitution, can be gi~en at the theoretical as well 
as the empirical level. Bhagwati and Krueger (1972), however, argue 
that the situation is unlikely to be wholly symmetrical, and that export 
promotion may be the superior strategy. Generally, the costs of excess 
export promotion are more visible to policv makers than those of import 
substitution. An export-oriented strategy typically will rely more on 
indirect, rather than direct interventions, and the former is considered to 
be typically les.s costly than the latter. Exporting firms must face price 
and quality competition in international markets; insofar as the adverse 
side effects of inadequate competition are less severe under the expor~­
oriented strategy, export promotion is superior simply because it reduces the 
incidence of the problem. Finally, if there are significant indivisibilities 
or economies of scale, an export-oriented strategy will enable firms of 
adequate size to realize them. The various symmetries and asymmetries 
between export promotion and import substituting ·strategies are likely to 
remain an important research focus. 
The spread of preferential trading agreements among LDCs, and between 
some DCs and LDCsf presents measurement problems not yet adequately tackled 
by the empirical literature on LDC export expansion. LDC common markets or 
free trade areas provide the conditions under which apparent export. expansion 
could be hiding the repetition at regional levels of national import 
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substitution excesses. In other words, a dollar earned exporting from 
Colombia to Peru, or to Bulgaria, may not be worth as much as a dollar 
earned by exporting to Germany, if the former carries with it the 
obligation to buy in return goods which are overpriced relative to alternative 
least cost sources, while the latter dollar can be used for purchases 
anywhere. Differential effects in other fields, such as employment, could 
also be expected between exports to common market partners, or to 
centrally planned economies under bilateral arrangements, and those to the 
rest of the world. A related point arises when growing exports are closely 
linked to heavy use of imported inputs, as in free trade zones in the 
Mexican border with the U.S. In either circumstance, using gross export 
data may yield misleading impressions. 
Although customs unions and free trade areas among LDCs have received 
a fair amount of theoretical, speculative as well as descriptive attention, 
as in Cooper and Massel (1965), Grunwald et. al. (1972), and Morawetz (1972), 
analyses of the economic consequences of their actual trade flows have 
been relatively rare, perhaps due to their recent creation and/or precarious 
existence. Exceptions include the Hansen (1967) and Willmore (1972) studies 
on the Central American Common Market. 
Recent Work on Other Perennial Issues of LDC Export Sectors 
Two aged theses emphasized by some species of export pessimists have 
also come in for rude attack during the 1960s by empirical research and 
contemporary reality. One identified LDC export instability. independent of 
trend, as another obstacle to growth. while the other preferred to express 
its export pessimism arguing that the long term trend in the terms of trade 
for primarv products (or for developing countries) was inevitably downward. 
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Looking at relevant 1946-58 numbers systematically, in an area where 
few had done so, MacBean (1966) created a minor scandal when he showed that 
export instability was not that much much greater in LDCs than in rich 
countries. Leaving aside such cases as Brazilian coffee and Ghanian cocoa, 
he also argued that primary product exports are no more unstable than 
manufactured exports. When data showed acute export fluctuations, he found 
that domestic factors, including weather, pests, political turmoil and 
economic errors, rather than shifts in world demand, were responsible. 
Finally, there was little econometric evidence showing a significant link 
between export instability and the stability and growth of GDP and capital 
formation. 
-
Examining the period 1950-66, Massel (1970) tested a number of 
possible explanations for export instability in rich and poor countries. 
The only variables showing significant coefficients are concentration in 
few export products, increasing instability, while absolutely large export 
sectors and unusual reliance on food exports are associated with less 
instability. A result related to the absolute size of the export sector is 
that of Erb and Schiavo-Campo (1969), who for 1954-66 found a negative 
correlation among LDCs between export instability and .the absolute size of 
their GDPs. These authors also found that between 1946-58, the MacBean 
period, and 1954-66, there had been an important.decline in export instability 
both in LDC and in rich countries, but in the latter more than in the former. 
Kenen and Voivodas (1972) concluded that the choice among various 
methods of measuring export instability and among plausible country samples 
do not affect their major results, which on the whole agree with those of 
MacBean. Results, however, are somewhat more sensitive to the choice of 
time period. For example, contrary to MacBean, they find a strong and 
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plausible negative connection between export instability and the level of 
investment.during the 1960s, which reopens the question of the extent and 
mechanisms through which export instability reduces investment levels. 
Mathieson and McKinnon (1972) focus on the instability not only 
of exports and aggregate GDP, but also on that of several GDP components, 
arguing that measurement techniques tend to misleadingly hide important 
LDC instability in large aggregates. They find that LDC instability is 
indeed substantially larger than in rich countries, but that there is no 
persuasive evidence that the international economy generally exerted a net 
destabilizing influence on LDCs from 1950 to 1968, partly due to the fact 
that rich countries during these years did not experience their business 
cycles in unison. Mathieson and McKinnon find that instability decreases 
with per capita income, but contrary to Erb and Schiavo-Campo, they find 
that the country size....e!E ~• as measured by absolute GDP levels, bears 
no significant link with instability. They also obtain some weak evidence 
indicating that the more open an economy is, as measured by the ratio of 
exports to GDP, the lower the instability will be. Although that link is 
not strong statistically, they certainly can say that there is no basis 
in their results for supporting the traditional view linking instability 
with openers and outward looking trade policies. 
The main thrust of the above is to undercut general contemporary 
arguments for international commodity schemes and for restrictionist and 
interventionist domestic trade policies, justified ~y the alleged harmful 
effects of presumed export instability on LDC economies. Ad hoc cases of 
instability which require particular policies, of course, just as ad hoc 
grounds for optimum export taxes, are not weakened by the surveyed results. 
Studies of pre-World War II LDC export instability should yield interesting 
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results, a~d are likely to indicate that declines in that instability, and 
of its negative impact on development, are due to improved macro and 
sectoral economic management both in developed and developing countries. 
As noted by Helleiner (1972, Chapter 5), the focus on exports as 
a source of instability in LDC economies has been usually based on the 
belief that other elements in aggregate demand within those countries 
were not as important, in the short run, in determining the level of aggregate 
economic activity. LDC exports are supposed to influence economic activity 
not only via demand effects, but also through their effects on feasihle 
import supplies. At least for the study of business cycles in the larger 
LDCs, such traditional focus is clearly out of date. The fact that in 
many LDCs imports show greater instability than exports cannot be explained 
without a closer examination of the interplay between domestic policy 
instruments, including monetary and fiscal policy, not only with external 
demand conditions, but also with the use of foreign trade policy instruments, 
particularly the exchange rate. The stop-go macro policies which have been 
observed in several semi-industrialized countries and the induced domestic 
instability have more to do with the sporadic and reluctant way in which 
devaluations have been handled, than with disturbances arising in world 
markets. In other words, postwar instability in, say, Ar.gentine or Turkish 
investment, particularly in construction, has a lot in common with that found 
in the United Kingdom, a hypothesis hardly illuminated by the traditional 
focus on export instability. 
Theoretical and empirical work on the determinants of secular trends 
for LDC terms of trade, so popular during the 1950s, was on the whole 
neglected during the 1960s, perhaps due to general agreement that the terms 
of trade, whatever their trend, were not the key variables to focus on when 
-43-
discussing trade policy and development. On the theoretical front, the works 
of Arthur Lewis (1969) and Emmanuel (1972) have already been mentioned. Lewis 
adds to his theoretical model a historical-empirical test, concluding that 
the reason tropical countries were experiencing in 1965 net barter terms of 
trade,which were unfavorable compared with the situation before the First 
World War, was fundamentally that the world price of wheat had risen less 
than the price of manufactures, due to sharp increases in U.S. argicultural 
productivity in the context of relative immobility of farm populations 
(pp. 24-25). 
Emmanuel presents a Marxian model of the terms of trade, based on 
the labor theory of value, which has a number of similarities with the 
Lewis view, anchored in "unlimited'' supplies of labor generated by low 
productivity LDC subsistence food sectors, and with the Kindleberger (1956) 
emphasis on LDC-rich countries terms of trade, rather than on those between 
primary and manufactured products. Emmanuel also emphasized the relatively 
greater international mobility of capital, which could include huma.n_ capital, 
contrasted with the contemporary international immobility of unskilled labor. 
Empirical work on terms of trade based on the "unequal exchange" thesis has 
been mostly polemical; of particular interest is the use made by Rumanians 
of this thesis in their arguments with COMECON, as described by Montias (1967, 
Chapter 4). In this debate, the less developed Rumanians argued that they 
had to spend more labor time to produce a unit of value at world prices, than, 
say the Czechs .who produce their exports with higher labor productivity. 
Not surprisingly, the Czechs argued that so long as world prices were free of 
monopolistic elements, there was nothing exploitative about such a situation. 
One may remark, in passing, on the curious fact that some of the Western 
observers who are most admiring of the protectionist Rumanians, are the same 
who sneer with most zeal at LDC inward-oriented policies. 
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On the empirical front, nothing as monumental as Kindleberger's 
(19~6) terms of trade study has been forthcoming during the 1960s. Besides 
the empirical aspects of the Lewis lectures, the Porter _study (1970) of 
postwar primary product price movements may be mentioned. For the period 
between the late 1940s through the early 1960s he documents a generally 
falling trend for the prices of forty-six primary products. He also finds 
that demand for primary products typically may be very price-inelastic,££ 
very income-inelastic, but not both. In an interpretation in line with that 
of Lewis, he suggests that the greater ability of the advanced countries 
to raise productivity in primary products, presumably non-tropicals, is part 
of the explanation of their increasing domination of the more income-elastic 
products, a domination which has tended to increase since the late 1930s. 
Evenson (1973), in turn, suggests that differential productivity advances 
are partly expl~ined by variations in expenditures on agricultural research 
and development, a field in which many LDCs have seriously lagged, particularly 
outside traditional staples. 
The recovery of LDC terms of trade since the early 1960s, perhaps a 
partly offsetting consequence of past import substitution excesses, may also 
account for the recent scarcity of te~ms of trade studi~s. and the quiet 
filing of policy proposals linking terms of trade movements to domestic or 
international (e.g., aid) policies. On the other hand, the spectacular 
success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries has encouraged 
those wishing to use commodity agreements to raise selected LDC export 
prices, while alarming some who only a few years ago emphasized LDC impotence 
to do fny such thing. 
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Managing LDC Foreign Exchange Availabilities during the Postwar: Mechanisms 
for Suppressing Import Demand and their Consequences 
Even if the supply of foreign exchange had a zero elasticity with 
respect to the export exchange rate, the precise nature of the trade regime 
and of the mechanisms used to repress import demand could have important 
repercussions for efficiency, income distribution and growth. For many LDCs, 
their postwar trade regimes, featuring differential import exchange rates, 
high and uneven import duties, import and exchange controls, and prior 
import deposits, in fact evolved from their policy reaction to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, when their supply of foreign exchange was highly 
inelastic to their export exchange rate, if indeed it did not have a negative 
elasticity. But once such complex restrictionist regimes were in place, 
first legitimized by the balance of payments crisis, they gradually took 
on a more openly protectionist nature. 
The measurement of the costs and consequences of tariff protection 
is to be discussed in detail elsewhere in this volume, so two long paragraphs 
on the subject will suffice here. The use during the 1960s of the concept 
of effective rates of protection provided additional quantification tools 
which documented and dramatized, first, the high and uneven nature of LDC 
tariff structure, and later, the similar characteristics of the overall net 
impact of all the import repressing mechanisms. The recent work of Balassa 
and Associates (1971) summarizes and extends this type of research. Of the 
six LDCs studies in depth, Balassa finds a considerable degree of discri,n­
ination in favor of manufacturing and against primary activities in four of 
them, which also have the largest interindustry variation in effective rates 
of protection. Such variation, it is argued, is not the result of conscious 
and systematic planning decisions, a conclusion also reached by the Desai 
(1970) study of the Indian tariff commission. There may be, however, some 
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political method in such economic madness. For the cases of Mexico and 
Pakistan, Balassa found large differences between rates of tariff and implicit 
protectio~ showing that tariff data will not by itself appropriately describe 
the structure of protection in countries which employ quantitative restrictions 
to limit. imports. 
Another approach for measuring the extent and consequences of trade 
restrictionist regimes was pioneered by Bruno (1967) and Krueger (1966), 
using the concept of domestic resource costs, whose differences and similarities 
with that of effective rates of protection have recently been explored 
(Bruno, 1972, and Krueger, 1972b). · In her in-depth study of ten Turkish 
industries, Krueger found a significant gap in real domestic resource 
costs per dollar earned or saved between the lowest cost -import-substitution 
activity and the most costly potential export industry. She also found a 
spread of about 'ten to one between the highest (an import substitution firm) 
and lowest (a potential export firm) domestic resource costs estimated. 
Yet, she notes that Turkish trade policies removed virtually all incentive 
for the potential export firms studied. Rejecting export pessimism, she 
tentatively suggests that twice as much output, in value terms, could be 
obtained from new resources with a liberalized trade regime and an equilibrium 
exchange rate. Her results, of course, depend h~avily on 'the across-the-board 
application of the small country assumption to all Turkish activities, as 
well as on the assumption of constant costs. Other related detailed studies 
of the impact of restrictionist trade regimes in LDCs include those of 
S. R. Lewis for Pakistan (1969), L. L. Johnson for the Chilean automobile 
industry (1967), and Baranson for a larger sample of automobile firms in 
LDCs (1969). 
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A good part of the typical LDC restrictive trade regime relies not 
on general signals transmitted via tariffs and subsidies, nor through clear 
and universal administrative rules, but on a maze o~ ~ hoc bureaucratic 
decisions and obscure rules of thumb. Not without reasons, most researchers 
have_ tended to stay away from a careful study of such disconcerting reality, 
preferring to handle them with a few well chosen critical generalizations, 
sure to be received with approval by the rest of the profession. Writers 
associated with Anglo-Saxon traditions have usually found the labyrinths 
of quantitative controls somewhat more Kafkaesque than authors used to 
Latin bureaucracies did, which, as Italy shows, may be compatible with and may 
survive economic development. But serious studies of these matters have 
begun to appear, as may be seen in Chapters 15 and 16 of the Bhagwati and 
Desai volume for India (1970), and Chapter 8 in the new Krueger study of 
Turkey (1972a): More should be on the way from studies on exchange control, 
liberalization, and economic development, sponsored by the National Bureau 
of Economic Research (Bhagwati and Krueger, 1972). Even more than with tariff 
protection, it is generally agreed that quota protection has been generally 
granted and used indiscriminately. 
Administrative import and exchange controls are typically blamed for 
a large number of inefficiencies, many difficult to quantify. Their delays and 
red tape are said to: waste private and public enterpreneurial time and 
energy; require additional clerical staff to handle paperwork, in both 
government and industry; give rise to other extra expenses (e.g., flying 
back and forth to capital cities to deal with bureaucrats); lead to excessive 
domestic inventories; have peculiar rules of thumb stimulating overbuilding, 
capital intensity, and excess capacity; favor large firms and discriminate 
against new and small entrepreneurs; encourage administrative corruption 
and smuggling; help to extinguish competition and technological change in 
domestic markets; slow down the inflow of foreign technology; arbitrarily 
alter the composition of imports; encourage industrial concentration in 
the capital city; and, of course, lose potenti~l tax revenue for the state. 
Solid empirical documentation of these chirges is -~till scanty. 
One suspects that some of the generalizations may rely too much on the 
complex psychology of Indian civil servants. Brazilian and Colombian postwar 
import controls, for example, did not have the same tendency displayed by 
those of India to rigidly use installed capacity as criteria to allocate 
import permits, nor to encourage machinery as compared to intermediate 
imports in the face of excess capacity due to input shortages. Perhaps the 
costs of administrative controls become very high only for very large 
countries and/or when too little reliance is placed on other, more orthodox, 
import repressing mechanisms. 
At any rate, the key question continues to be how different things 
would be if controls are replaced by the other mechanisms. Noting that 
under import c9ntrols, for example, 100 large firms receive 50 per cent of a 
country's import permits hardly proves that controls lead to economic 
concentration, although it may show that controls do not prevent concentration. 
Observing that import controls coexist with exces~ capacity or corruption 
is also not very enlightening. One would have to show, or give persuasive 
reasons indicating that matters would be different in an LSS world, or that 
they are different in countries without such controls (adjusting for other 
differences!). More on this in the next section. 
The study of import control mechanisms has typically focused on 
merchandise trade, often leaving aside importsof services. Yet the handling 
of service payments usually offers prima facie evidence of gross inefficiencies 
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as well as inequities. Without paying the equivalent of import duties, 
the followi~g frequently have access, even if linited, to foreign exchange 
at overvalued exchange rates: foreign investors in import substituting 
activities, tourists, parents of students abroad, users of foreign ships, 
and users of foreign patents. Particularly in the field of optimal control 
of technological services imports, where world markets can hardly be said 
to be competitive, much empirical and theoretical work remains to be done, 
in spite of the pioneering work of Vaitsos (1970) and Katz (1972). 
One subject receiving increasing empirical attention is that of 
illicit transactions, primarily under restrictionist trade regimes. Such 
illicit transactions include old-fashioned smuggling, inward and outward, 
and under- or overinvoicing, of imports and exports, as a way to avoid 
exchange controls and other departures from unified and equilibrium exchange 
rates. When considering alternative trade policies, their vulnerability 
to evasions and corruption is an important consideration (Bhagwati, 1968a). 
Going beyond unreliable anecdotes, systematic empirical work in this area 
includes that of Bhagwati on alleged Turkish fake invoicing (1969), which 
uses partner-country trade data to obtain presumptive evidence on the degree 
of faking going on. For the Pakistani case, Winston (1970) found that the 
effective price to the firm at imported capital goods was .reduced by more than 
45 per cent, as compared against its recorded value, as a result of fake 
overinvoicing of those goods, and subsequent illegal exchange transactions. 
More is expected from the NBER project already mentioned, and from a 
collection of papers on the subject edited by Bhagwati. It may be noted 
that trade policies vulnerable to corruption and evasion include not only 
those for which there exists a negative prima facie economic argument. 
For example, Colombian and Ghanaian export taxes on coffee and cocoa, respectively, 
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which could be defended on optimum tariff grounds are bedevilled by outward 
smuggling as much as less defensible export taxes. 
Much of the 1960s debate on LDC trade policies suffered from the 
use of terms such as import-substitution, protection, promotion, etc., 
whose exact definitions were often ambiguous. The typical definition of 
import substitution, that used by Chenery (1960), was devoid of welfare 
implications. The proportion of total supply of a particular good obtained 
via imports rather than from domest'ic production can decrease, i.e., import 
substitution occurs, either because a tariff is placed on that good, or 
because devaluation makes imports more expensive, or for a number of other 
reasons. 
Desai (1969) clarified and called attention to possible alternative 
definitions of import substitution, some based on optimality notions, and 
explored various ways of actually calculating the purely descriptive measure. 
Alternative descriptive statistical procedures arise from different ways 
of handling departures from base year import-availability ratios, degrees 
of aggregation, and ways of handling intermediate demands generated by import 
~ 
substitution. Both Desai and Diaz-Alejandro (1970, Chapter 4) noted the 
importance of aggregation. The commonly heard remark that import substitution 
has stopped in many LDCs because they have been unable to 'lower their aggregate 
ratio of ·imports to supplies can hide two conflicting tendencies: an 
across-the-board decline in each industry's imports-to-supplies ratio, and 
an increase in the weights of the more import intensive industries, which 
may benefit from high income elasticities of demand. 
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~orl~y and Smith (1970) note that a given imported good substitutes 
for the ot1t·;,ut of many domestic value adding activities. and that the 
standard measures for import substitution in a given sector do not quantify 
the t"wo components of total supply. imports and domestic production. on the 
same gross production rasis. They show for the Brazilian case that the 
usual measures underestimate import substitution by domestic intermediate 
goods i~Justries. which now supply intermediate value added previously 
cmlodied in imports. 
After the Rout: The New Trade Policies and Development 
In spite of theoretical and empirical lacunae. on the whole evidence 
does appear robust for the proposition that trade policies in many LDCs 
during the 1950s and the 1960s left much to be desired. But even under the 
assumptions that world trade will continue to expand. i.e., that no new 
1929s are to be feared, and that most LDCs have now a varietv of policv 
tools and choices. allowing them to tackle distortions directlv. important 
research and policv questions remain: How easy or difficult is the 
transition ·between old and new trade policies. both economically and 
politically7 Haw far must old policies be dismantled and new ones installed 
to achieve significantly positive developmental results? Even if the old is 
totally abandoned, how much can 1'e expected frbm the new trade policies? 
Starting already in the late 1950s. ma~y of the semi-industrialized 
LDCs attempted to liberalize their restrictive trade regimes. while in 
some cases attempting to check inflation. "Liberalization" is here defined 
in the Bha~1ati-Krueger (1972) sense; it is said to be attempted when there 
exists the intention to let the official price of foreign exchange assume an 
increased role in the domestic alloc.ation of resources. Diaz-Alejandro (1965) 
-52-
examined the painful Argentine stabilization and liberalization attempts 
up to that date, focusing on the large redistributions of income triggered 
by massive devaluations, and the unsurprising failure of domestic supplies 
to respond quickly to highly unstable relative prices. The stop-go macro 
policies arising from the commitment to a pegged rate, ~poradically and 
dramatically devalued every two or three years, were also analyzed in that 
book. The Turkish case, as that of Argentina, also illustrates the difficulty 
of isolating transitional problems due to fighting inflation, from those 
arising from liberalization (Krueger, 1972a, Chapter 4). This, of course. 
is related to the difficulty of parcelling blame for excess costs between 
uneven inflation and restrictive trade regimes while that not unusual 
comtination is in full bloom. 
Somewhat different issues have been raised by the analysis of the 
1966 Indian devaluation (Bhagwati and Srinivasan, 1973c). In that case, as in 
the Turkish 1958 devaluation, the impact of the parity change was more than 
offset by the reduction and removal of surcharges, taxes and export premia, 
leading to a major difference between nominal and effective devaluations. 
This leads to confusion in public opinion, when the nominal devaluation is 
assessed as if it were also an effective devaluation. The 1966 Indian case 
also illustrates the dangers of liberalizing under pressure from aid donors, 
and the importance of timing liberalization attempts with relatively favorable 
exogenous factors. e.g., good harvests and terms of trade. These two points 
are also hi~1ly relevant for studving the short run failure of the Colombian 
1965-66 lil-eralization attempt, and the friction between manv Latin American 
governments and institutions such as the I.M.F. The links between aid. 
liberalization and stabilization in Latin America have been examined with 
particular verve by Hayter (1971). 
Cooper's (1971a and 1971c) impressive review of about three dozen 
recent devaluations in developing countries also concludes emphasizing 
that managing a devaluation through the transition phase to final success 
requires both judgment and delicacy of handling. He confirms that although 
the price level often rises, real aggregate demand frequently falls following 
a devaluation, and so does the public official linked to the devaluation 
decision. 
By now there is general agreement that stabilization and liberal­
ization attempts should be managed gradually (LSS, Chapter 10); few share the 
1950s and early 1960s orthodox enthusiasm for shock therapy, which left more 
than one patient wondering whether the net present discounted benefits of the 
cure were higher than the present discounted costs of the disease. The 
recessionary tendencies which frequently accompany stabilization and 
liberalization'plans, contrary to what is expected from devaluation and 
resource allocation theory, and which occur even as the rise in the price 
level accelerates, 
9 have been blamed on a variety of factors, which seem 
to operate with different force from country to country. Large redistribution 
of income may transfer purchasing power from those with high to those with 
low propensities to spend on locally produced goods. The rise in domestic 
prices of tradeable goods triggered by devaluation will exert downward 
pressure on real cash balances, a tendency which may be aggravated by overly 
restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. In LDCs with rigid and segmented 
capital markets, this can put severe strains on various compartments of the 
credit market, such as those providing working capital for industrial firms, 
and for housing and construction, leading to supply-induced output declines, 
besides the standard cash-balance effects. 
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Cooper (1971b) also notes how devaluation can lower aggregate 
demand in aid-receiving countries, acting essentially as an excise tax, 
at least in the short run, and explores wealth effects arising from devaluations 
in countries with foreign debts. There may also be simply an asymmetrical 
response to the new incentive structure: sectors subject to new negative 
signals rnav pick up those more quickly and effectively than those which 
should be expanding in response to positive signals. 
Not all stabilization and liberalization attempts have led to 
catastrophe, even if all had to undergo difficulties, and research on 
happier experiences can tell us something regarding the other two questions 
raised at the beginning of this section. A major point emerging from the 
successful cases, as noted before, is that to reach rapid growth in exports 
it was not necessary to dismantle totally the paraphenalia of controls 
inherited from the stage of import substitution, nor to enter fully into an 
orthodox neoclassical, decentralized world. Indeed, as shown in the cases of 
South Korea (Frank, 1972) and, more recently, Colombia, many administrative 
rules can be quickly turned around and used to encourage new exports, just 
as before they were used to promote new import-replacing activities. The 
authorities, in fact, can use existing market distortions. e.g., in the 
credit market. to give their export promoting policies greater leverage. 
As shown by the post-1967 Brazilian example, it -is not even necessary to 
eliminate inflation, or even lower it below fifteen .per cent per annum, to 
generate an export boom. Many successful liberalization attempts did not 
really try to eliminate or massively reduce protection to trulv import-competing 
industries. limiting import liheralization efforts mainlv to those goods and 
services which do not compete with established domestic industry (Michaely, 
1973). At any rate, the least-risk strategy is clearly to first get exports 
up and then liberalize imports. This does not appear to be as difficult 
as many thought a few years ago. 
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The above gives substance to the earlier suggestion that concept­
ualization of trade and development problems of many LDCs is on firmer 
ground in three sector models, with some factor market imperfections, in which 
the competition for resources between the export and the import-competing 
sectors is mitigated by the existence of a home good or subsistance sector 
which can gradually yield resources to both (if the price is right.) 
The view of liberalization, which is gradualist regarding its 
timing and marginalist (!) with respect to the degree of change needed in 
policy instruments to achieve higher export growth rates, gets some support 
from the argument (Schydlowsky, 1972; Dudley, 1972) that a large number of 
LDC import substituting industries developed during the last thirty years are 
not as inefficient, uncompetitive and technologically stagnant as the most 
extre~e critics of import substitution suggest. One need not argue, as 
some do, that ~he stage of import substitution was a necessary precondition 
to the development of new exports, to notice that much of the productive 
capacity created during that stage can be turned around fairly readily toward 
export expansion. This argument, of course, while tending to decrease the 
urgency of drastic changes, also indicates that full adoption of neoclassical 
policies, including devaluations which will partly compensate lower protection, 
will only hurt the real white elephants, which may not be so many. 
This view implies that LDC postwar growth rates have been, after all, 
. 10 
most 1y rea 1 , even measured at wor ld prices. Another reason why even LDCs 
convinced of the excesses of past policies and the need for greater exports, 
may be reluctant to abandon suddenly all exchange and other controls is 
simply the fact that as one looks around the world in early 1973 one observes 
many developed countries returning to such practices as exchange controls 
and dual exchange rates, not to mention wage-price controls. In an uncertain 
world, it may be wise to hang on to a variety of policy tools. 
A lesson emerging from both successful and unsuccessful liberalization 
attempts, par~icularly in medium and large countries subject to inflationary 
pressures, is the great importance of.handling devaluations using crawling 
pegs, rather than the Bretton Woods system of infrequent and large parity 
changes. Brazilian and Colombian growth rates for exports and GNP, for 
example, have recently become not only higher but also less unstable, and 
their crawling pegs seem to have more to do with those results than any 
profound revision of their protectionist system (Donges, 1971). In other 
words, improved short term macroeconomic and balance of payments management 
in inflation-prone semi-industrialized LDCs may explain a larger share of 
their higher growth rates than that attributable to the presumed reallocation 
of resources from inefficient import substitution activities toward efficient 
export lines. 
The new policies are clearly yielding higher per capita growth rates 
in capitalistic LDCs as diverse as South Korea, Brazil, Taiwan and Colombia. 
Higher exports have permitted sharply expanded levels of machinery and 
equipment imports and, therefore, of capital formation. It is noteworthy 
that Cuban economic authorities, not widely regarded as orthodox neoclassicists, 
put great emphasis on the link between expanding exports and growing capital 
formation, leading to a domestic resource allocation and~ _plan which can 
11
be characterized as an export-oriented staple growth strategy. But the 
impact of new trade policies on domestic savings, besides those operating 
via the easier import of capital goods. are unclear, and appear secondary 
to results flowing from policies regarding local capital markets. 
Evidence on whether the new policies are reducing the marginal capital­
output ratio, and if so, through which mechanisms, is not yet robust. Higher 
growth rates, by themselves, are known to reduce that ratio. But the new 
policies could further reduce it by improving resource allocation 
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(Krueger, 1972a, Chapter 9), and by using up excess capacity. Reduction of 
average excess capacity, in turn, can result from the dampening of stop-go 
cycles, and/or from the elimination of mechanisms through which protectionist 
trade regimes allegedly stimulated idle installed capital. 
The study of excess capacity in LDCs has picked up considerable 
steam recently (Winston, 1971; Thoumi, ,1972; and Calvo, 1972). But the 
precise extent to which incorrect LDC trade policies can be blamed for such 
idle capacity remains obscure. There are several complementary explanations 
for excess capacity, and many have little or nothing to do with trade policies. 
It does seem plausible that excess profits induced or renewed by protection 
could lead to excess entry and Chamberlinian coexistence, ~r that due to 
small domestic market size and indivisibilities many import replacing 
projects may have a capaci~y unlikely to be fully used for many years. But 
the quantitative impact of these and other hypotheses is far from established. 
Similar considerations apply to the impact of the new trade policies 
on LDC employment. Krueger (1972a, Chapter 9) shows that if Turkish 
manufacturing investment had been allocated following sectoral shares in 
value added or investmer.t in 1963, instead of following the development plan, 
the same investment volume would have generated greatly increased manufacturing 
employment opportunities, besides reducing marginal capital-output ratios 
and import requirements (see also Power and Sicat, 1971). The evidence on 
employment growth in Taiwan and South Korea is also impressive (Ranis, 1972), 
but once again it is difficult to sort out exactly that part which can be 
credited to higher growth rates of aggregate output, from other effects, such 
as changing output composition, changing capital-labor ratios, etc. 
Sweeping the Leontief paradox under the carpet, even though Baldwin 
(1971) has pinpointed its source mainly on U.S. trade with Canada, Oceania 
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a~d LDCs, we tend to assume that new LDC exports will be lahor intensive, 
although there are skeptics, such as Sheahan (1~71). As many such exports, 
even those going to world markets and not to free trade area partners, come 
from large firms, often foreign, which have also been active in import 
substitution, the skepticism regarding the q·uantitative impact on employment 
output mix Justi ie 
labor ratios between large and small firms within the same industry can he 
larger than such differences between sectors. Furthermore, a good share of 
the new exports are made up, directly or indirectly, by land-intensive primary 
products, whose labor use may or may not be greater than in labor substituting 
activities. 
There is, after all, one small country "success story" which has 
for a long time followed free trade policies at least vis-~-vis a major 
industrial center, and where unemployment continues to be a serious problem. 
The case of Puerto Rico could also be fruitfully used as a near-free-trade 
comparative benchmark for excess capacity, capital-intensity and income 
distribution studies, even though (or perhaps because) that island has other 
notorious market imperfections (L. Reynolds and Gregory, 1965). It should 
also be noted that there are other sound theoretical reasons. besides sticky 
wages, to expect some LDC unemployment even in small countries following 
· optima~ trade policies (Fields, 1972). Furthermore, fast export expansion 
could lead to a relaxation, in some LDCs, of controls over imports of labor­
replacing machinery. 
As in the case of LDC rural supply responses, evidence has been 
accumulating showing that substitution possibilities between capital and 
labor in LDC productive activities are generally not zero (Clague, 1969; 
Fei and Ranis, 1971). But beyond this weak statement, interpretations 
differ and generalizations become shakier; Behrman, for example, interprets his 




estimates (1972) to imply that Chilean flexibility in response to changes 
in international markets is limited and that adjustment takes a long 
time, giving some support to the structuralist view. Behrman also concludes 
that Eckaus' technological explanation for LDC unemployment is supported 
by his results, and finds that sectors generally thoiight to serve as the 
predominant absorbers of surplus labor are among those with most limited 
estimated substitution possibilities. 
-Firmer answers to the above doubts should also help settle the 
quantification of how LDC income distributions are likely to react to the 
new trade policies. As with industrial structure and concentration ratios, 
differences in income distribution turned up by cross section studies are not 
plausibly explained by differences in trade policies (R. Weisskoff, 1970)_ 
Even the allegedly favorable Taiwanese income distribution could have more to 
do with previous land and educational reforms than with trade policies. 
Note that even if the new trade policies trigger massive labor-intensive 
exports, they are also likely to accelerate GNP growth, and periods of growth 
acceleration are generally regarded as conducive to growing inequality 
(Despres, 1973). It is not clear that Stolper-Samuelson will dominate 
Schumpeter. Furthermore, new land-intensive primary product exports often 
come from LDCs where land ownership is far fro.m evenly distributed. These 
skeptical remarks can be extended to the impact of the new trade policies 
on regional distributions of income and economic activities. 
Whether the new trade policies and higher exports significantly 
stimulate X-efficiency and technological change remains also an empirically 
open and researchable question. Much seems to depend on the institutional 
environment in which the new exports are being generated, and on what is 
regarded as the likely alternative scenario. For example, if those exports 
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are mainly forthcoming from foreign firms training large numbers of local 
workers and managers. who rapidly leave to work for local firms, the 
diffusion of new techniques will be greater than if such turnover is low 
(Cohen, 1972a). But foreign firms whose great asset is typically 
' 
1know-how" are unlikely to go out of their way to promote the spread and 
difussion of the knowledge on which their power is based. The mechanism 
through which the bargain on patents and licenses for new exports is 
struck, and differences it may present with the equivalent process for import 
substitution, is also obviously important. Will foreign firms spend more 
on adapting to local conditions in export or in import substitution 
activities, and what does that imply for domestic welfare? Will the new 
'\ 
price structure arising from the reformed trade policies induce local and 
foreign entrepreneurs to search for "right" innovations in significant 
amounts, even if· credit and labor markets remain imperfect? 
But the. most fundamental doubts about the new trade policies arise 
not on purely economic grounds, but on those related to fuzzier, but no 
less important, developmental targets and aspirations. The large role of 
foreign investors in new export activities, larger perhaps in Latin America 
than in the Far East, has been already documented (Vernon, 1971) and is 
likely to become greater than it was under the import substitution strategy 
(Helleiner, 1973; de la Torre, 1972). Many LDC exports will consist not 
of finished products, but of semi-finished commodities, which are also 
imported in a somewhat less finished state, both being part of vertically 
integrated international industries. As workers in an assembly line, LDCs 
will have in those cases little knowledge of what comes before or after 
them in the production process, a knowledge which will be reserved for those 
running the whole operation from abroad. Thus, even as LDC control over 
overtheir traditional natural resource exports tends to grow, their control 
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new exports could start from a very low base, renewing a sense of dependency 
and frustration. 
If large exports of labor-intensive exports materalize, the need 
for wage and labor "discipline" will grow, a discipline likely to be exerted 
either by the reserve army of the employed or, particularly when surplus 
labor dries up, by the other army. Indeed, it is quite disconcerting that 
neoclassical liberal policies are more often than not pursued by LDC regimes 
with notoriously illiberal politics, while democratic LDC governments 
typically provide a good share of horror-show inefficiency stories. It is 
also a bit unseemly that some of those eager to promote the new exports, and 
who become outraged at income inequalities arising from the higher wages of 
the ''aristocracy of the proletariat," appear to get much less excited about 
other income inequalities. 
Concluding remarks 
The scholarly research community should he kept busy docume~ting 
and analyzing the various possihle developmental consequences of the new 
LDC trade policies. The task must include improving and extending the available 
data base. In particular, fresh insights are most likely to come from dis­
aggregate3 and sample data than from further manipulation of rather dog-eared 
national accounts and other macroeconomic aggregates. In the meanwhile, as 
· always, LDC trade policies will react, and should react, to trends in the 
world economy. In spite of recurrent monetary crises and threats of commercial 
wars among the rich, the LDCs face a world market on the whole prosperous 
and diversified. It is in their interest to stimulate such diversification, 
and in particular, to fight trends toward domination of the world market for 
trade, finance and technology by either a few countries or a few MNCs. In 
trade policy discussions, it is frequently too glibly assumed that domestic 
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monopoly problems can be resolved simply by putting down import barriers 
and letting "world competition" do the job. Alas, in some sectors even the 
whole market may not be big and diversified enough to result in sufficient 
competition. LDC investments in expanding their own networks of information 
and intelligence gathering about imperfect and uncertain world markets for 
commodidites, technology and finance, i.e., a kind of LDC "Consumer Reports," 
should become a key element of their "trade policies." LDCs could profitably 
rethink their acceptance of world arrangements, such as the Paris patents 
convention, which appear to benefit mainly the rich. LDCs also have an 
interest in new international monetary rules which minimize the possibility 
that rich countries will thrust the burden of adjusting their balance of 
payments on.to LDCs. Sudden unilateral import surcharges, defaults on the 
convertibility of debts, etc., are no monopoly of LDCs, as recent actions by 
rich countries ,faced with payments problems show. 
13 
How far the rich will be willing to accommodate their economies to 
new LDC exports remains a difficult matter to forecast exactly. Yet a good 
share of the heated debate on how far LDCs should go in adopting this or 
that trade policy typically depends on often implicit assumptions regarding 
world demand. The key ''staple" for many contemporary LDCs is simply 
unskilled labor, and, particularly for the large LDCs, it is unlikely that 
exports of this "staple" can reach the relative developmental significance 
which wheat, timbe~, meat, etc., had last century for the development of the 
success stories of that time, whose populations represented tiny fractions 
of world totals. It is also unclear how far the rich will permit those LDCs, 
choosing to be outward-oriented in trade but reluctant to permit foreigners 
to handle their new cxports,to take advantage of wealthy markets. Yet this 
combination is perhaps the most appealing to LDCs worried about both exchange 
earnings and national autonomy (Myint, 1969). In view of these uncertainties, 
LDCs would do well to continue working toward the creation and expansion 
of common markets among themselves, hopefully in ways which minimize repetltion 
of the past errors in import substitution. 
Much empirical research on the exact impact of the new export expansion 
on the growth, employment, income distribution and national autonomy of 
different ty~es of LDCs remains to be done. But it should be added that the 
. . h b h.rout of export pessimism as not een a pyrr 1c victory,. 14 nor are t he 
achievements in the recent trade and development literature to be dismissed 
lightly. The air has been cleared of nightmarish myths dreamed up mainly in 
the 1930s, and important analytical tools have been developed to help LDC 
authorities to avoid, if political will exists, at least the worst errors in 
evaluating projects related to the foreign sector (Bacha and Taylor, 1971; 
Little and Mirr~ees, 1969). Suitably employed, economists who know the shadow 
price of everything and the social worth of nothing ace more useful than 
bureaucrats who know neither. Studies on crawling pegs also led to. gradual 
acceptance of that technique. Indeed, it can be argued that the major 
contribution of research on trade policies during the 1960s has been to provide 
concepts and tools which should make exchange crises, trade problems, etc., 
become less of a pressing preoccupation during the 1970s to LDC policy makers. 
The ridiculous extent to which LDC public opinion followed every new local 
balance of payments crisis can be made largely a thing of the past, allowing 
policy makers to turn, if they have the will, to really basic developmental 
problems such as mass poverty and low rural productivity. We have little to 
say on those problems, but perhaps our conscience is saved by showing policy 
makers how to avoid letting the basically small problems of trade and payments 
policy absorb too much of their attention. Many of us who look at development 
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wearing international trade.glasses may have trouble accepting tha
t for 
mos~ large and medium-sized LDCs trade policies are a small part o
f the 
development problem. Furthermore, as good firemen, our efforts du
ring the 
1960s have already helped to make such part even smaller, freeing 
development 
planning from the tyranny of avoidable payments crises. But only 
those aspiring 
to use their knowledge of trade theory as a base to conquer roles 
as world 
saviors should object to being labelled simply honest draftsmen, w
ith a few 
magic formulas and much empirical homework to do. 
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FOOTNOTES 
*Friends and colleagues at the Yale Economic Growth Center have 
been a great help in the preparation of this paper. Richard Brecher~ 
Benjamin I. Cohen, Richard Cooper, Ernestine Jones~· Christina Lanfer, 
Vahid Nowshirvani and Gustav Ranis deserve special thanks, but no blame 
if their efforts are not well reflected by this survey. Helpful and 
extensive comments from Jagdish Bhagwati, I.M.D. Little and Peter Kenen 
are also gratefully acknowledged. 
1This result is somewhat peculiar, as Ronald Findlay argues in 
this volume. Less ambiguously, low elasticities of substitution in 
consumption and production will make the short run adjustment problem 
more complica~ed. 
2Ricardo's dictum to the effect that income distribution is the 
major concern of political economy was largely unheeded, until very re­
cently, in postwar mainstream research, theoretical or empirical, on 
trade policies and development. 
3such as less tha.~ full f.:!ID.ployment, profit rates not very different 
from those in rich countries, but much lower real wages, etc. 
4The growing role of MNCs, and to a lesser extent of state-owned 
enterprises, in international trade, will make the borderlines between 
trade, location and industrial organization theories increasingly blurred 
(Caves, 1971b). The internal rules of large bureaucratic units will neces­
sarily influence trade theories as- such units spread their activities 
across several countries. Analytical problems raised by the study of 
such administrative rules, in turn, are remarkably similar to those arising 
from research on non-market socialist economies. 
5 rn a cross country study of industrial concentration ratios, Pryor 
(1972) found that average four-firm, four-digit concentration ratios among 
large industrial nations are roughly the same, in spite of alleged policy 
differences in anti-trust policies. Concentration in those large nations, 
however, was less than a~ong smaller industrialized nations. Rank orders 
of concentration ratios by specific industries were found to be roughly 
the same in all nations. A difficulty in all cross-country studies, but 
of particular importance to those involving LDCs, is the difference which 
exists in relative price structures from country to country. For example, 
in comparing investment rates in GNP, cross-country studies seldom take 
into account differences in the relative prices of capital goods, which 
can be large. 
6 rn more recent, unpublished work, Chenery (1970a and 1970b) explicit­
ly introduces trade policy orientation, as well as capital inflow, as explan­
atory variables of the trade and development patterns he isolates. For 
example, he blai~es a policy of import substitution at the expense of export 
promotion for the abnormally low levels of exports, not offset by sub­
stantial capital inflows, observed for Argentina, Uruguay, Chile and Turkey. 
Nevertheless, size of country still emerges as ~he most important difference 
explaining various patterns. In this kind of analysis the level of 
agg!'egation and the time span one has in mind very much influences the 
judgement regarding how much "policy matters" for both the speed of growth 
and its structure. 
) 
7 some recalcitrant export pessimists make the aesthetically under­
standable point that it is difficult to wax enthusiastic about a boom in 
exchange earnings which is partly based on items such as wigs, false teeth, 
dog toys, plastic flowers, and, in some-countries, blood and cadavers, not 
to mention earnings from the sale of tourist services, not all of which 
originate in ticket sales at the local anthropological and historical museums. 
8Assurning that LDC non-tradeables are on balance more intensive in 
unskilled labor than tradeable goods, and that the importance of the sub­
sistance sector which makes up a good share of non-tradeables declines with 
development, it is to be expected that the ratio of unskilled wage rates 
to the exchange rate will be positively correlated with per capita incomes. 
Departures from such "normal" relationships could provide clues regarding 
degrees of over or undevaluation of currencies. See also Balassa (1964). 
Much remains to be done in making the.distinction between tradeables and 
non-tradeables both more empirically useful and theoretically more integrated 
with the traditional models used to derive the show-piece theorems of inter­
national· trade. It is not clear, for example, whether the share of non­
tradeables in the absorption basket depends only on per-capita income, or 
also on country size. Size, in turn, can be defined in terms of geographical 
extension, population or total output. The.precise degree of "tradeability" 
of different commodities is a difficult matter to establish precisely, but 
it is probably a mistake to regard all agricultural and manufactured goods 
as one hundred percent "tradeable." 
9nuring the late 1950s and early 1960s many economists from industrial­
ized countries looked upon explanations of alleged coexistence of output 
recession with price inflation in semi-industrialized countries with a mix-
ture of amusement and doubts about both the economists proposing explana­
tions and the peculiar economies where such queer happenings were said to 
occur. As the Argentinization of first the United Kingdom and then of the 
United States advanced during the 1960s and J970s, one began to hear even 
from rigorous macroeconomists in the rich countries rather mystical explana­
tions for "stagflation," not so different from those offered in semi­
industrialized economies in the 1950s. 
10As shown by Bhagwati and Hansen (1973b), the usual measure of 
growth rates based on data at domestic market prices is the correct one 
if one is looking for an indicator of the development of actual welfare, 
assuming a well-behaved community preference map. For other purposes, 
valuation at international prices is more desirable. But in general, these 
authors argue,. we cannot tell whether a particular measure "exaggerates" 
the growth rate. 
11 · 
The developmental consequences of the bizarre blockade impos_ed on 
that island by some members of the world trading community, incidentally, 
have not been yet carefully analyzed. The issues are similar, but hardly 
identical, to those involved in the study of the impact of wars and the 
1930s -D.epression on LDCs. The even more complex issues surrounding massive 
reorientation in LDC trade links, as a result of donestic and foreign pol­
itical decisions, require for their study going way beyond the pure theory 
of foreign trade, as Hansen and Nashashibi (1972) emphasize in their study 
of Egypt. 
12
The fact that many new LDC exports come from firms which, thanks 
to protection, still rely on captive domestic markets for most of.their 
sales, and which "dump" say ten percent of their output at marginal cost in 
world markets, raises the paradoxical possibility that a lowering of 
·protection for the output of such firms may decrease their exports, for 
a given installed capacity. 
13world financial disorder and inflation during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, however, probably had a positive net effect on LDCs. When 
the 1930s Depression hit, and the world price level fell unexpectedly, 
LDC long term foreign debts typically exceeded their short term foreign 
exchange assets. During the Secon<t World War and its aftermath, when the 
world price level rose, LDC exchange reserves exceeded their foreign debts. 
For a change, during the recent world inflation the long term foreign debt 
exceeded exchange reserves in most LDCs, excepting mainly oil countries, 
thus partly providing the real debt relief sought by many (e.g., Pearson, 
et.al., Chapt~r 8). 
14Although written while discussing rich country policies, the 
following warning by Paul Samuelson (1972, p. 450) is relevant here: 
"There are correctly formulated systems in which elasticity pessimism is 
a correct doctrine rooted in irremovable real elements. Our world may not 
be like such models. And no doubt many writers of the late 1940s were 
paranoid on this subject. That does not mean we can take as established, 
either by valid deductive reasoning or plausible inference from the exper­
iences of the last two decades, that 'elasticity optimism' is assuredly 
correct. The jury is still out on this empirical question ••• " 
15A reviewer of books on the lives of G.D.H. Cole and Lord Robbins 
recently suggested that " ••• economics is more a matter of temperament than 
the reaching of scientific conclusions from an objective survey of the 
evidence" (Paul Johnson, The New York Times, book review section, January 
7 5 1973). Hopefully 5 this will be less true in the future than it has 
been in the past for the field of trade policy and development. 
-------
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